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ABSTRACT 
 
 The focus of this research was to examine the effects of mayoral control on 
operational and financial structures within school systems. Furthermore, this study 
focused on the public perception and political implications of the mayor’s position on 
local education. The four systems chosen for this study were: Boston, Chicago, District of 
Columbia, and New York City. All four systems were total control districts, which 
allowed for each mayor to appoint a majority to the school board and appoint a 
superintendent or chancellor to oversee the day to day operations of the school district. 
 This study focused on operational and financial structures, which make up a 
sizable portion of the larger organizational structure. These indicators often drive how 
services and expenditures eventually affect the core business of these school systems. 
 From an operational perspective, this study was focused on expenditures, both in 
aggregate form and for instructional related services, pre and post takeover. From a 
financial perspective, this study focused on changes to revenue sources, return on 
investment, interest on school debt, and capital outlay. From a political perspective, this 
study examined the data from the various State of the City addresses over the last four 
years in each of the four cities, along with polling data available for New York City and 
the District of Columbia. 
 This study was concluded with a summary of findings, and implications for future 
research, policy, and practitioners. The research showed that New York City and Boston 
generally outperformed the District of Columbia and Chicago in the operational and 
financial metrics used in the study. Furthermore, the number of years a city had been 
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under mayoral control and operational and financial indicators had no significant 
relationship.  
 It was recommended that future researchers should continue to study the benefit 
of benchmarking metrics of organizational performance to ensure mayors are held 
accountable for the reforms they espouse during election cycles. 
 Ultimately, mayors’ success in managing their school systems will be based on 
where they prioritize. This research offered a cross section of metrics by which mayors 
can benchmark their effectiveness as they change operational, financial, and 
organizational structures to bring about better, overall organizational performance from 
their school system. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE PROBLEM AND ITS CLARIFYING COMPONENTS 
Introduction 
In December 2008, then President-elect Barack Obama nominated Chicago Public 
Schools (CPS) Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Arne Duncan, to become the next United 
States Secretary of Education. Duncan had no formal training in educational 
administration prior to his appointment as CPS chief executive officer in 2001. Also, his 
appointment was not made by a traditional school board. Duncan was appointed by 
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley who had complete authority over the Chicago Public 
School system. Duncan’s appointment to lead President Obama’s education agenda 
highlighted a growing trend in public education’s accountability era: the rise of mayoral 
takeovers of school systems. Five years earlier, education philanthropist Eli Broad, in a 
speech to state education leaders, stated, “I don’t mind telling you that I believe in 
mayoral control of school boards or having no school board at all. We have seen many 
children benefit from this type of crisis intervention . . .” (Broad, 2003).  
Edelstein (2004) stated, “Urban mayors are very concerned about education in 
their cities, the quality of the public schools and the impact of education on the economic 
vitality and viability of their cities” (p. 16). Mayoral takeovers of school districts have 
occurred through either state legislative action or voter referendum. However, mayoral 
takeovers have generally been the result of poor student achievement, operational 
inefficiencies, financial mismanagement, or any combination of the three. At the time of 
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the present study, New York City, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Boston were 
examples of city school systems under mayoral takeovers.  
The threat of mayoral and state takeovers, whether for academic or financial 
purposes, is real. Today, takeovers are permitted by statute in about half the 
states, and they’re allowed by some city charters. The No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) Act also grants states the power to take over failing schools, although 
that provision has yet to be enforced. (Black, 2008, p. 34) 
 
The consequences of mayoral takeovers have been substantial. First, traditional, 
single member school boards have been relegated to an advisory role. Mayors have 
replaced the existing superintendent with an appointed school superintendent, usually 
with far-reaching power, only having to answer to the mayor. Second, mayoral takeover 
has usually precipitated wholesale changes in organizational structure and administrative 
personnel. For example, Joel Klein, the school chancellor of New York City Public 
Schools, a mayoral control district, instituted a new core curriculum in reading and math, 
closed many underperforming schools, preferring to reopen those schools as smaller 
learning communities, and hired school principals directly from the teacher pool. 
Schacter (2009), reporting on Klein’s actions, indicated that none of these changes could 
have been instituted under the previous school governance structure. Third, mayoral 
takeovers have affected the organizational identity of a school system to change from the 
traditional school district bureaucracy to more closely resemble another city government 
department (Wong & Shen, 2003).  
Mayoral takeover of public schools has been a relatively new political movement. 
This study was conducted to add to the evolving research focused on the factors 
precipitating mayoral takeover, the structural changes made to school districts as a result 
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of mayoral takeover, and the organizational characteristics of successful takeover districts 
as compared to districts in which mayoral takeover has been less successful. Case study 
methodology was used to identify successful implementation strategies of changes to 
organization structures by focusing on four takeover districts: Boston, Chicago, New 
York City, and Washington, D.C., the latter being the most recent mayoral takeover city. 
The researcher also sought to identify potential risks to mayoral takeover, both political 
and organizational, using examples from districts other than those that were the major 
focus of this study. 
Statement of the Problem 
Much has been made of takeovers of public school systems by mayors of major 
cities such as New York City, Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D.C. Consequently, 
such takeovers have produced a single point of responsibility for the successes and/or 
failures of those public school systems. The takeovers have brought about significant 
changes to the organizational structure of these school districts and have resulted in either 
streamlining systems or creating bigger bureaucracies. Such takeovers have been 
accompanied by tremendous political risks. School board members have carried their 
own political weight and often have enjoyed recognition and influence within specific 
territories or areas of cities. Furthermore, not all states have had statutes that allow 
municipal executives to take over their school systems. These mayors and their appointed 
school chiefs have enjoyed long standing support of the public in their respective 
takeovers. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which the organizational 
structure of a school district has tended to change after mayoral takeover. Also, the 
purpose was to examine whether those school districts under mayoral takeover shared 
similarities as to how they were structured pre- and post-takeover. Of further interest was 
the investigation of how organizational structures of school districts under mayoral 
control differ from those of other school districts under traditional school board 
governance. 
Research Questions 
Following are the research questions, which were used to guide the study. The 
research questions provided the foci for the examination of public hearing documents, 
speeches, and organizational and financial indicators. 
The research questions investigated were:  
1. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the operational effectiveness of 
the school district?  
2. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the financial health of public 
schools?  
3. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the public perception of public 
schools?  
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Definition of Terms 
Capital Outlay--expenditures used for facility improvements, new construction, 
infrastructure repairs, changes, and upgrades; technological expenditures as part of 
permanent school structures (NCES, 2010). 
Chicago School Reform Act of 1995--the legislation passed by the Illinois 
General Assembly authorizing Chicago mayor Richard M. Daley full control over the 
city’s education system. It further empowered Mayor Daley to appoint a five-member 
trustee board to develop, implement and oversee comprehensive school reform in CPS 
(Electronic Summary of the Chicago School Reform Act of 1995, 1995). 
Civic capacity--“cooperation [facilitated by mayors] among political, economic, 
and civic actors necessary for school politics to rise to the level of comprehensive school 
reform” (Carl, 2009, p. 309). 
Educational Management Organization (EMO)--companies or nonprofits that 
manage multiple schools (Whittle, 2005). 
Expenditures--funds spent to operate local public schools within a district 
including salaries, energy costs, interest on school debt, payments to private and charter 
schools, books and materials, and student transportation (National Center for Education 
Statistics [NCES], 2010). 
Federal Revenue--“Include direct grant-in-aid to schools or agencies, funds 
distributed through a state or intermediate agency, and revenues in lieu of taxes to 
compensate a school district for nontaxable federal institutions within a district’s 
boundary” (NCES, 2010, p. 18). 
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Financial Health--the extent to which financial metrics improved pre and post 
mayoral takeover. 
Instructional Related Expenditure--“current expenditures for activities directly 
associated with the interaction between teachers and students, including teacher salaries 
and benefits, supplies, and purchased instructional services” (NCES, 2010, p. 18). 
Instructional Support Staff--“includes instructional coordinators and supervisors 
and instructional aides” (NCES, 2010, p. 18). 
Integrated Governance--a new style of city governance that incorporates school 
district management into the other governance functions of a local municipality (Wong, 
Shen, Anagnostopoulos, & Rutledge, 2007).  
Interest on School Debt Expenditure--“interest expenditures on long-term debt 
(NCES, 2010, p. 18). 
Library/media Staff--“professional staff members who are assigned specific duties 
and school time for professional library and media service activities. Includes 
library/media specialists and support staff” (NCES, 2009, p. C-2). 
Local Revenues--revenues generated from “local property and nonproperty taxes, 
investments, and other student activities such as text book sales, transportation and tuition 
fees, and food service revenues” (NCES, 2010, p. 18). 
Local School Councils (LSCs)--a decentralized governance model, unique to 
Chicago, that acts as part school advisory council, part board of trustees; has the ability to 
recommend hiring and firing of school principals; each school has one (Shipps, 2004). 
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Mayor centrism--the transfer of wholesale decision making regarding the local 
school district from traditionally elected school boards to the mayor, thereby 
consolidating responsibility and power over all municipal agencies and functions (Henig 
& Rich, 2004). 
Mayoral Takeover--the act of using state statute, legislation, and/or voter 
referendum to grant the mayor the authority to take over the schools within their 
municipality.  
Operational Effectiveness--the extent to which resource reallocation occurs 
towards schools and away from traditional central office and non-instructional overhead 
expenditures. 
Partial Control Theory--a type of mayoral control in which the mayor assumes 
partial control over a school system, sharing decision making with elected school board 
(Kirst, 2002).  
Partnership Relationship Theory--a type of mayoral control in which the mayor 
has very little statutory authority over the school system, but who is active in decision 
making among the elected school board (Kirst, 2002). 
Per Pupil Expenditures--“current expenditures for public elementary and 
secondary education in a state (or territory) divided by the student membership” (NCES, 
2009, p. C-3). 
Politics--conceived as conflict between competing groups and interests (Viteritti, 
2005).  
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Public Perception--the extent to which voters perceives the state of education in 
their city and the extent to which they assign responsibility of that perception to the 
mayor. 
School Administrators--any staff member whose job function is primarily 
managing the daily functions and operations of a school (NCES, 2009). 
State Revenue--“includes both direct funds from state governments and funds in 
lieu of taxation. Revenues in lieu of taxes are paid to compensate a school district for 
nontaxable state institutions or facilities within the district’s boundary” (NCES, 2010, p. 
20). 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)--a standards-based reform model 
established by NCLB with the goal of every student achieving proficiency in each major 
academic area by the 2013-2014 school year (Electronic Summary of the No Child Left 
Behind Act, 2001).   
Total Control Theory--a type of mayoral control of a school system in which the 
mayor assumes total control and responsibility over a school system. In most cases, the 
mayor actually assumes control over the school board and appoints all members of the 
school board (Kirst, 2002). 
 Total Revenue--“additions to assets that do not incur an obligation that must be 
met at some future date, do not represent exchanges of fixed assets, and are available for 
expenditure by the local education agencies of the state” (NCES, 2010, p. 20). 
9 
 
Urban Regime Theory--a theory in which policy change comes only if mayors 
and civic leaders establish a new political paradigm commensurate with the new policy 
being advocated (Stone, 1998). 
Methodology 
 This study was conducted using a qualitative analysis of organizational structures 
of school districts before their mayoral takeovers and after the takeovers had been fully 
implemented. The research questions were based on a 2007 study of organizational 
effectiveness conducted by Wong et al. Because this was a mixed mode analysis and 
political forces could have impeded the collection of reliable and valid data, data 
collection was limited to that which could be obtained from the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data (CCD), speeches, and polling data. All 
collected data were available to the public. Many of the organizational structures in place 
pre-takeover were first addressed in conferences organized by political groups interested 
in the takeover of their schools before they were ultimately implemented post-takeover.  
 The data collected were merged in order to identify common operational and 
financial elements in place prior to takeover, which may, following a takeover, have 
changed significantly under mayoral control. A similar process was used when examining 
the research questions regarding the effect of mayoral takeover on public perception of 
organizational effectiveness, financial health of the school district and operational 
effectiveness of the school district.  
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Population and Sample 
The population for the study was defined as all public school districts under 
mayoral control: Boston, Chicago, New York City, and Washington, D.C. The sample 
used in this study consisted of the four largest urban total control theory districts as of 
June 30, 2009. The four districts were chosen because they were total control theory 
school systems and each current mayor had initiated the change in school system 
governance. The sample districts had been under their current governance structures for 
as few as two and as many as 17 years. Table 1 provides some basic background 
information on each of the four districts. 
 Even though each of the four districts have been under total control during a 
single mayoral administration, the varying number of years each district has experienced 
mayoral control will help in determining whether length of time plays a crucial role in the 
long term success of total control theory as an education reform strategy. 
 
Table 1  
Background Information: Four Total Control Theory Districts 
 
District Mayor Year Elected School Control Initiated 
Boston 
 
Thomas Menino 1992 1991 
Chicago 
 
Richard Daley 1989 1995 
District of Columbia 
 
Adrian Fenty 2006 2006 
New York City Michael Bloomberg 2001 2001 
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Data Collection 
Data collection was initiated through municipal and school district websites, the 
National Center for Education Statistics’ annual reports and local periodicals. Data 
collected from the National Center for Education Statistics’ annual reports were used by 
the researcher primarily to quantify data pre- and post-mayoral takeover in the districts 
studied and, in some cases, to compare to similar sized districts. Data were also collected 
through the Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, municipal websites, and local 
periodicals. 
Limitations and Delimitations 
 This study was limited by the scope of school districts included. Because of the 
conditions imposed, there was no attempt to generalize the findings beyond the districts 
studied. Furthermore, “mayor-led integrated governance has not provided a policy 
prescription designed for all U.S. cities” (Wong et al., 2007, p. 53).  
 This study was also limited to the generalization of financial data. Because cost 
of living increases adjust revenues and expenditures at a constant rate, this study does not 
account for inflation, deflation, or cost of living increases. This study did not account for 
attrition rates of appointed school board members, changes in mayoral spending 
priorities, or management style of the mayor. This study was further limited by the nature 
of the inquiry. Specifically, the inquiry involved the review of selected documents and 
CCD statistics studied. In some cases, fiscal year data was not available in report form on 
the school districts studied until two to three years after the closure of that fiscal year. 
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This study was further limited by the availability of polling data specific to education 
policy in local political races. 
This study did not include mid-sized total control districts like Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania and Trenton, New Jersey, districts under partial control, partnership 
relationship, or low-to-medium involvement theories. Furthermore, any district within a 
state with statutes that did not allow for the lawful takeover of school districts was not 
included in the study.  
This study was delimited to the study of large, urban total control school districts. 
The study was further delimited by the minimum length of time (two years) the district 
has been under total mayoral control. 
Significance of the Study 
The relative success of mayoral takeovers in several metropolitan areas has left 
the public to ponder whether this governance strategy was localized among large cities or 
if this was a movement that could permeate other parts of the country. School boards and 
school district superintendents have had to critically examine whether their districts’ 
operational and financial structures look similar to those districts before mayoral 
takeover. The significance of this study was in the determination of characteristics and 
patterns of operational and financial structures of school districts before mayoral 
takeover. These determinations were intended to be helpful to (a) school district and 
municipal officials in making decisions regarding mayoral takeover, (b) school boards in 
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preventing takeover from occurring, or (c) replicating the successful models of large, 
urban, total control theory districts.  
There has been little research conducted examining the organizational structures 
of school districts pre- and post-takeover. The researcher’s intent in this study was to 
examine certain operational, financial, and political characteristics existed within school 
districts that may have prompted takeover. Furthermore, the researcher investigated the 
extent to which changes to operational and financial structures put in place during 
mayoral takeovers represented certain philosophical changes consistent with a particular 
leader or style of school takeover. For example, prior to assuming full control of the 
Washington, D.C. school system, Mayor Adrian Fenty commissioned New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and his top educational advisors and leaders of the city school 
system to provide a framework under which a successful transition from traditional board 
governance to mayoral control could take place (Hernandez, 2009). 
Mayoral takeovers have also brought about certain creative changes to traditional 
school district bureaucracy. In the present study, the researcher identified examples of 
creative changes that occurred during the takeovers. For example, after dealing with a 
school busing issue, Mayor Bloomberg appointed one of his most vocal critics to a new 
position as the district’s family engagement officer. This position was designed to help 
ease tensions and to respond to critics who said parents’ voices were not being heard 
prior to policy decisions (Sack-Min, 2007). 
14 
 
Organization of Study 
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the study. It focused on the problem 
studied, provided a definition of terms, a brief overview of the methodology used, and the 
significance of the study. Chapter 2 contains a review of literature pertinent to the study. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology used to conduct the study and details the procedures 
used in the collection and analysis of the data. Chapter 4 consists of the analysis of the 
data. Chapter 5 is the culminating chapter of the dissertation containing a summary of the 
findings, conclusions, implications for policy and practice and future research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND RELATED RESEARCH 
Introduction 
 Mayoral takeover has been a new relatively new movement in public education, 
and prior research has been narrow in scope and limited in terms of useful longitudinal 
data. “Despite more than four hundred published books, articles, and studies on board 
appointment and mayoral control, fewer than a dozen explicitly examine their impact on 
school reform in more than a cursory fashion” (Hess, 2008, p. 224). There has been some 
research conducted on the theoretical framework of mayoral takeover, the precipitating 
environmental factors, and initial implementation of organization structural changes. 
However, “not even a handful of rigorous, systematic studies have examined the effect of 
school governance” (Hess, 2008, p. 224). This chapter has been organized to review 
literature related to mayoral takeovers in public education, the impact of takeovers on 
school governance, the new generation of mayors, and their involvement in the business 
sector of their cities. The four forms of mayoral involvement in education in cities are 
presented, and literature is reviewed related to issues of mayoral control, the reallocation 
of resources, and unsuccessful attempts at mayoral control. 
Mayoral Takeover in Public Education 
The shift in public school governance from single member elected school boards 
to mayoral control began in the 1960s. Salisbury (1967) stated that “the entire governing 
scheme (traditional school boards) was based upon the myth of a unitary community for 
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which school board members could ably speak” (p. 420). Viteritti (2009) described the 
change as being predicated upon the increasing competition for school board vacancies, 
particularly in racially diverse urban communities. Cultural rivalries, teacher unions, and 
the civil rights movement have contributed to school board elections and decisions 
becoming a new political dynamic in local politics. The traditional school board 
governance structure evolved as a response to political corruption and mismanagement. 
Ironically, these are the same reasons why the devolution of the school board has 
occurred and major cities have returned to the mayor as a single point of accountability 
(Watson & Hill, 2008). 
The mayoral influence in public schools changed dramatically in the 1980s and 
1990s. Since the 1980s, politicians have used public education as an issue of local, 
national, and international importance. Numerous reports have indicated that the United 
States’ system of public education has been producing mediocre results in comparison to 
other industrialized nations (Lagorio, 2005). Meanwhile, politicians and communities 
have been searching for answers to the perpetual problems plaguing urban, municipal 
school systems.  
Danielson and Hochschild (1998) predicted that mayoral control would be a short 
lived political movement for several reasons, 
In this political world, no reform proposals, about either educational practices or 
processes, are so persuasive that they are likely to create broad based coalitions 
committed to massive change. And without such a coalition or central direction, 
educational policymakers are unlikely to agree--even within a district. . .thus 
piecemeal incrementalism appears inevitable, with the pace and direction of 
change strongly influenced by the particular context. . .the most powerful message 
emerging from these studies is that given the configuration of local political 
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forces, there are no clear rules about how to create, sustain, or motivate either 
educational reform from below or the pursuit of national goals from above (p. 
294). 
 
Other critics have claimed that mayoral control would stifle support for schools by 
denying citizens their vote as to who was to govern public education within their districts 
(Watson & Hill, 2008). Education reform has historically fit into certain models and 
packages. According to Watson and Hill (2008), mayoral control had the potential to look 
vastly different depending on the mayor’s level of statutory authority and political 
influence. This would make replication of results from district to district very difficult to 
attain.  
 Reid (2009) reported that mayors, despite competing political forces, have 
become savvier in regard to education. They have acknowledged that “the welfare of 
their communities is linked to the success of their schools” (p. 8).  
Kirst and Bulkley (2000) believed that there were several conditions that 
precipitated a mayoral takeover. First, bureaucratic dysfunction has been perceived as a 
root cause of mayoral takeovers of schools. School district bureaucracies “can create 
unanticipated consequences and tensions between written rules and reliance on expertise. 
In many cases, these conflicts can lead to near paralysis” (p. 540). Second, the public’s 
waning confidence in the existing school governance structures has been viewed as 
another factor in the rise of mayoral takeovers. Prior to the Chicago School Reform Act 
of 1995, Chicago residents had been used to teacher strikes and financial 
mismanagement, which hindered schools from opening on time. When events such as 
teacher strikes have occurred and numerous reports have surfaced in the local media 
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regarding financial mismanagement, the public has had no choice but to question the 
legitimacy of the existing governance structure. Often times, this sequence of events has 
led to school board dissention and in-fighting among board members. 
Third, the new demands on city governments with the decreasing availability of 
federal and state grants for low socio-economic children have made education an 
attractive option to help shore up the support and ability to provide city services to the 
low socio-economic areas of a given city. As Kirst and Bulkley (2000) suggested, mayors 
have been in need of shoring up the support of fragmented social groups under one 
umbrella. Watson and Hill (2008) agreed that “mayors . . . are less prone to 
micromanaging, better able to coordinate services for youth and children, and serve much 
broader constituencies than traditional school boards” (p. 9). Lastly, the accountability 
movement has caused education to become a central political issue. Mayors have been 
held accountable not only to citizens but also to business and industry for developing a 
reliable, highly skilled workforce. In order to put forth necessary economic development 
projects, business leaders have needed to be reassured that the local educational system 
was a successful one. The decision to assume responsibility for the city’s schools has had 
economic implications for cities with declining revenues as well. As middle class and 
upper middle class professionals and families have relocated to the suburbs, mayors have 
suffered from the loss of tax revenue generated by those citizens. According to Watson 
and Hill (2008), families might be more inclined to shed their suburban lives in favor of 
urban living if they knew the school system was as high performing and well managed as 
suburban districts. 
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Conversely, Danielson and Hochschild (1998) have expressed the belief that 
mayoral control was a low risk, high reward political calculation for mayors choosing to 
seek control of their city’s schools. They based their position belief on the relative 
disassociation between mayors and their cities’ schools prior to mayoral involvement. 
“Mayors generally have steered clear of education, rarely being punished electorally for 
ignoring failing city schools, and get involved to primarily advance their political 
interests” (pp. 293-294). 
 Many mayors of large cities have been granted the authority to reform, reshape 
and redefine their cities’ schools. Through legislative authority, change in city charter, or 
voter referendum, mayors have seized on the operational, financial and academic failures 
of their school systems and pinned their political futures on the successes of their 
educational reform-oriented platforms, while other mayors have viewed school takeovers 
as a way to streamline all city services. Usdan (2006) explained, “With approximately 40 
percent of children. . . growing up in abject poverty. . . all our institutions must be 
reconfigured to meet children’s complex and interrelated educational, health, and social 
needs more adequately” (p. 149). Many mayors, city leaders, and school administrators 
have realized that public schools cannot solve the complex issues facing those students 
from poverty and their families. Furthermore, Usdan (2006) suggested that “political 
leaders are recognizing . . . that efforts to improve students’ academics must be buttressed 
by efforts to improve children’s health and the social conditions in which they live” (p. 
149). This was a distinct departure from the traditional form of mayoral governance, 
which focused more on “redistributing jobs to supporters and cronies. . . In this 
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reconceptualized role, these mayors projected an image of efficient public managers who 
could spread that efficiency to their school systems” (Usdan, 2006, p. 153). Furthermore, 
Usdan (2006) explained that mayors could effectively use their powers and activate 
community resources better than elected school board members. Kirst and Bulkley (2000) 
explained, “During the 1980’s, integrating children’s services became a priority. . . the 
separation of schools from city government hindered the coordination of services and 
restricted the ability of educators and city officials to use school sites as one stop centers 
for providing services” (p. 542). Another circumstance that has perhaps encouraged 
mayoral involvement in public schools has been the high turnover in district leadership 
that has frequently occurred in large urban districts. Usdan (2006) purported that the 
“frequent turnover in superintendents . . . might enhance the case for mayoral 
involvement on the grounds that it will provide more stability” (p. 157). 
Each mayoral takeover has been different. One takeover model in a major city has 
not been appropriate for another city’s takeover. Furthermore, cities have been faced with 
different challenges. Whereas one city may have been faced with high unemployment, 
another city may have had an influx of immigrants (Black, 2008). Comprehensive school 
reform may have been easier for some mayors to achieve than others for a variety of 
reasons. However, when looking at Chicago, New York City, Boston, and Washington, 
D.C., mayoral control of schools came early in the mayors’ terms, allowing mayors to 
spend political capital earned from their elections. “They can do so in spite of centrifugal 
forces, and limited formal powers appears attributable to their success in weaving 
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together both formal and informal sources of power” (Henig, Hula, Orr, & Pedescleaux, 
1999, p. 16). 
For all cities, however, time has been an issue. Mayoral takeovers have required 
years to fully impact the academic, financial, and operational aspects of the school 
district. Joel Klein, the Chancellor of New York City Public Schools, appointed by 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, claimed, ”It’s impossible to turn failing schools around in 
just two or three years” (cited in Black, 2008, p. 35). Viteritti (2009), commenting on 
New York’s mayoral takeover, explained “that the most significant impact of mayoral 
control is to create a greater institutional capacity for change. That is no mean 
achievement in urban systems that have been instinctually resistant to innovation” (p. 29). 
New York City’s model for improving graduation rates has, however, been garnering 
special attention by mayors like Adrian Fenty who have been hungry for a dramatic 
turnaround in their public schools. 
The risk potential in mayoral takeovers has been vast. Wong and Shen (2003) 
explained that mayoral takeovers risk alienating professional educators by infringing 
upon their previously held professional autonomy. Furthermore, appointments to high 
profile jobs within a takeover school district may be filled by leaders who lack the 
expertise to make effective decisions pertaining to instructional or curriculum related 
issues. Wong and Shen (2003) have cautioned both mayors and the public to avoid 
utilizing a single metric for success. By pinpointing one metric, such as student 
achievement scores, mayors may lose sight of other measures, e.g., graduation rates, 
improvement of school facilities, teacher retention, and financial health. Kirst (2002) 
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argued that two mayors, Menino and Daley, have been able to successfully focus their 
takeover efforts on several metrics, using student achievement as their signature issue. 
Daley’s focus in Chicago has been on improving the lowest performing students. 
Menino’s focus in Boston has been on installing a new curriculum and staff development. 
Keeping student achievement as the primary metric has allowed both to receive 
reauthorization from their overseers, i.e., voters for Menino and the state legislature for 
Daley. Viteritti (2009) cautioned that the latitude afforded to mayors in such cities could 
also lead to overambitious practitioners, risking the delicate balance of power and 
alienation of school personnel and the general public who vote. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, economic difficulties across the country 
were jeopardizing reauthorization of some mayoral takeovers. Medina (2009) suggested 
that the State Assembly in New York was strongly considering withdrawing its support 
of Bloomberg’s control over New York City Schools due to the mayor’s recent 
statements regarding teacher layoffs. Bloomberg has been competing in a more politically 
difficult climate than either Menino or Daley, and reauthorization of the mayor’s eight 
appointed seats on the 13-member board has been projected to be a major issue during 
the 2010 legislative season. When questioned by the New York State Assembly’s 
Education Committee, Chancellor Klein had to defend the mayor’s right to appoint a 
majority of members to the school board in direct conflict to the objections posed by the 
city’s public advocate and comptroller. Klein was strongly questioned by lawmakers who 
demanded answers as to why it had taken so long to have formal conversations and to get 
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answers. Medina (2009) wrote, regarding lawmakers’ concerns that, “As both parents and 
officials, they found it almost impossible to get answers to basic questions” (p. 18).  
The mayors of Boston, Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C. were mayors 
who, at the time of the present study, had assumed total control and responsibility over a 
school system. They had also assumed responsibility for bringing about positive 
organizational changes to their respective school districts in order to fend off voucher 
proponents and other critics of public schools. Since the mayoral takeover phenomenon 
was relatively new at the time of the study, it seemed unlikely that major changes to 
student achievement, instruction, and organization would be experienced by voters and 
stakeholders for several years (Kirst, 2002).  
Mayoral Takeovers and School Governance 
 Maxwell (2009) quoted Eli Broad as arguing that mayoral control is “the only 
way to turn around a low performing district with a history of chaotic school board 
governance” (p. S10). Hess (2008) outlined four principles of effective governance:  
(a) Clear division of authority and responsibility, including the separation of 
governance and management activities and clear lines of accountability, (b) 
development of a coherent reform strategy, (c) patience and the focus to 
implement and support reform efforts over time, (d) effective engagement of the 
civic leadership and a broad range of stakeholders. (p. 10)  
 
Watson and Hill (2008) argued that the traditional school board structure was not 
conducive to governance improvement and that obstacles were allowed to permeate 
through the processes established for school governance. The aforementioned obstacles 
include:  
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public apathy, weak links between board members and other public and private 
sectors, difficulty in establishing relationships among board members and the 
superintendent, and an inability to develop close ties with other government 
institutions, including city government and the state. (p. 11) 
 
Viteritti (2009) believed that the assumption behind mayoral control, that ultimate 
responsibility of the local schools was in the hands of a single public figure elected by a 
larger portion of the electorate than most school board elections, could be the catalyst for 
school governance change; leveraging the power of municipal services to enhance district 
goals.  
Before the architects of school governance plan determine the powers of the 
mayor, they should carefully examine the structure of the municipal  
Government. . . The extent of a mayor’s power and the mechanisms that exist to 
check that power are found largely within the structure of the municipality. (p. 29) 
 
Furthermore, Viteritti implored school governance panels to build checks and balance 
into their systems to keep mayors out of the process of awarding school service contracts 
and analyzing and disseminating performance data. He believed that such systems would 
lend more credibility to new district governance structures by taking the politics out of 
education. Henig and Rich (2004) defined mayoral control in a similar context. “Mayoral 
control promotes accountability and democracy . . . by placing responsibility in the hands 
of an easily identifiable actor who is subject to election in high visibility, high turnout 
campaigns” (p. 7).  
Wong and Shen (2003) addressed the underlying organizational flaws within a 
school district as a precondition of mayoral takeover. Most total or partial control 
takeovers have come about as a result of public outcry for organizational restructuring. 
Four primary principles for takeover reform have been established: (a) Recognize that the 
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existing political structures are not easily alterable, (b) empower the district and state 
level administration to intervene in failing schools, (c) enable city hall to manage 
conflicting interests and reduce fragmentary rules, (d) integrate political accountability 
and educational performance standards at the system wide level. 
Wong and Shen (2007) were unable to decipher a consistent relationship between 
organizational effectiveness and mayoral control. Their findings indicated that the 
bureaucratic layers that exist between the city hall and the schools were providing a 
barrier to implementing an integrated governance approach. Their analysis showed that 
when the indicators studied in the districts under mayoral control were considered with 
those of districts of similar size and demographic makeup not under mayoral control, 
mayors have been unable to make significant changes in district operations. Wong and 
Shen have identified one possible reason for the lack of meaningful reform under 
mayoral control. Mayoral takeover has typically resulted in changes in higher level 
administration within a school district. However, the lack of communication between city 
hall and middle to lower level management has made reform difficult to achieve. Wong 
and Shen’s study has had serious implications for the Washington, D.C. takeover, as the 
chancellor of schools has not taken into account meaningful power structures within the 
school district, such as the influence of the unions, and has struggled to implement 
meaningful reform with stakeholder support. 
Traver (2006) argued that mayoral control did not require institutional consensus 
in order to alter existing governance structures in favor of the development and eventual 
implementation of new administrative policies and procedures. Furthermore, Traver 
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(2006) argued that high level administration and governance was the only facet that the 
mayor could truly dictate without consensus.  
A New Generation of Mayors 
 Mayoral takeover of public schools has been a relatively new school governance 
structure, which began in Boston in 1996. Mayor Menino of Boston began the mayoral 
takeover movement by gaining control of the city’s then failing schools through voter 
referendum. The research questions proposed for the present study focused on the effect 
of mayoral takeover on the various aspects of school board organizational function. 
Furthermore, the political fallout from such takeovers has required some investigation, as 
this can be another indicator of perceived success of mayoral educational reform. 
Eisinger (1997) suggested that the new mayors understand that public management has 
six pillars: reinvention, innovation, privatization, competition, strategic planning, and 
productivity. The new mayors’ definition of public management broke ties with 
traditional relationships such as teacher unions and civil rights groups, and forged new 
coalitions with a combination of political forces that could help them consolidate power 
and legitimize the need for school takeovers. In some cases, Kirst (2002) explained that 
this has placed the mayors at odds with the very groups that helped them get elected. 
However, Mayor Daley of Chicago would never have usurped control of Chicago Public 
Schools if the Republican controlled state legislature thought he was too loyal to 
traditional democratic constituencies such as unions and civil rights groups. 
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Mayoral takeover of public schools has been a relatively new by-product of the 
accountability era. Wong and Shen (2003) explained that  
by the 1960s, school boards and superintendents allied with the mayor to manage 
intense conflicts over educational issues; many of them were further complicated 
by racial and income inequities in big cities. The emergence of accountability-
based reform during the 1990’s created a new set of political realities for a more 
active mayoral role. (p. 5)  
 
Since A Nation At Risk (2001) was released in 1983, public education has become a 
political issue among municipal politicians. In the literature reviewed for this study, the 
effects of mayoral takeovers and the melding of public education and municipal politics, 
called “integrated governance” (Wong & Shen, 2007, p. 738) were reviewed. 
There are several reasons why mayors have felt compelled to take over their 
school systems. First, “With cities competing with the suburbs for middle class parents--
and the potential taxes they bring in--mayors have a big incentive to take over troubled 
urban school systems” (American School Board Journal, 2006, p. 12). Researchers have 
suggested that mayoral takeovers come as a result of one of three types of interventions: 
(a) state legislation that allows for a mayor to oust an elected school board in favor of an 
appointed one, (b) state legislation that allows for a city referendum to decide on whether 
the mayor should be allowed to appoint the school board, and (c) voter approval of 
changes in charter to appoint a school board. (Wong & Shen, 2007). The only caveat to a 
change in city charter has been that of the District of Columbia, in which the city charter 
may only be altered with congressional approval (Council of Great City Schools, 2007). 
Wong and Shen (2007) identified several advantages to the mayoral takeover 
model. First, the mayors, by positional authority, have had a wider support system from 
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which they can elicit support and “leverage resources from nonpartisan organizations,” 
(p. 744) whether financial or social. Mayors have also typically been in position to utilize 
their political resources on the federal level to secure more grants for their schools. In 
Nashville and Philadelphia, mayors have worked closely with members of Congress to 
secure federal funding for their school programs, above and beyond what has already 
been authorized for them in Title I. Carl (2009), in his research on mayoral involvement 
in Chicago’s public school system, reported that proponents of mayoral control gave 
mayors credit for their ability to organize “disparate social groups in to citywide 
coalitions to effect lasting improvements in education” (p. 307). Kirst (2002) also 
reported that supporters of mayoral control believed that this model of school governance 
would bring about greater economic development and, in turn, a more productive labor 
force.  
Mayoral Involvement and the Business Sector 
The mayors of the cities within this study have had the benefit of securing the 
support of the business community. “Wherever it has come about, mayoral control has 
usually received enthusiastic support from the business community. Business leaders 
favor a strong managerial model that puts a single executive in charge. . . ” (Viteritti, 
2009, p. 32). The business community in Boston had long struggled with aligning its 
resources with the city schools pre takeover. At the heart of these concerns was the lack 
of a consistent message among the school board, superintendent, and mayor. After 
Menino’s takeover in Boston, “the Private Industry Council and the Boston Plan for 
29 
 
Excellence. . . work closely with the mayor and superintendent in shaping school reform” 
(Portz, 2004, p. 109). This comports with Kirst’s (2000) theory that mayoral involvement 
could provide the stability that citizens and the business community craved.  
Mayor Daley made it clear that, unlike mayors before him, he would “integrate 
the public schools into his plans to make Chicago a global corporate hub and a tourist 
destination” (Shipps, 2004, p. 85). When outlining his plan for the Chicago Public 
Schools, Mayor Daley “made it clear that the schools were to become part of his plans for 
economic development” (p. 102). Daley developed a plan for renovating the schools, 
hoping to attract middle class families back to the city. His renovation plan not only 
brought back middle class families to city schools, but also generated large construction 
contracts for local businesses. The socio-economic changes to Chicago’s neighborhoods 
also brought new businesses into neighborhoods as part of a massive neighborhood 
gentrification program centered around the newly renovated schools. The new economic 
realities of a recession, though, have called into question how the mayor would reconcile 
public education funding and economic development in the midst of a recession. During 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, Daley was able to mobilize city stakeholders and civic 
leaders around the idea of economic development via educational reform. Though he has 
been able to rebuild much of the city’s more industrial areas, large educational reform 
problems have persisted, particularly with a new schools chief.  
Wong et al. (2007) attempted to capture the essence of the Chicago Public 
Schools’ mayoral takeover: 
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 Under mayoral control, district leadership reorganized central administration in 
ways that reduced fragmentation and improved public confidence in the schools. These 
changes helped to restore the district’s political capital, enabling its leaders to develop 
and implement an ambitious educational agenda (p. 136). 
Integrated governance theory provides a mix of expectations about mayors’ 
performance in the fiscal realm. . . Improving the school district’s bottom line is 
likely to raise public confidence in the system and help the mayor’s electoral 
standing. . . Beyond fiscal health, however, the ex ante predictions of integrated 
governance are more nuanced. Integrated governance recognizes that from a 
financial perspective, mayors may be pursuing potentially cross-cutting 
objectives. . . integrated governance is a flexible form of urban governance that 
allows local conditions to determine which strategies the mayor will adopt (p. 
142). 
 
Daley’s success in attracting middle class families back to the city caught the 
attention of civic leaders in Seattle, who have been looking at improving school quality 
as a means of keeping middle class families from exiting the district in favor of private 
schools or schools in surrounding suburbs. Increasing the property tax revenues in Seattle 
would help offset pending budget deficits in Seattle’s schools due to salary increases and 
teacher contracts (Watson & Hill, 2008).  
Aarons (2009) described how the business community in Chicago has initiated 
venture philanthropy by sponsoring the start-up costs for a new charter school or 
committing valuable resources to help professional development programs like National 
Board Certification and principal induction programs. Such philanthropic efforts have 
been initiated by the takeover of city schools by Mayor Daley as well as a commitment 
by businesses to see schools as the vehicle for producing the next great generation of 
Chicago’s citizens.  
31 
 
Perhaps the most successful partnership between business and public schools has 
emerged in New York City. Traver (2006) detailed the business community’s initial 
effort to lobby New York State lawmakers to pass legislation granting control of New 
York City schools to the mayor. “In 2001, a group of industry executives appealed to 
Albany for mayoral control of the city’s educational system. There rationale was simple: 
a centralized system was necessary to produce graduates who can thrive in a competitive 
economy” (p. 503). In a March 25, 2002 editorial (Business crucial to school reform) in 
Crain’s New York Business, all business groups, from local chambers of commerce to 
industry associations, were called upon to support the mayor’s vision of centralizing the 
school system and make someone responsible for what happens in schools. Since his 
election in 2002, Mayor Bloomberg has raised more than $240 million for public schools, 
not including a $150 million grant from the Gates Foundation for smaller high schools 
and continued leadership development (Maxwell, 2009). A strong relationship with the 
business sector has allowed mayors to leverage their authority as mayors, their business 
acumen, and their allies to marginalize the powerful interest groups that could hinder any 
reform initiatives they may introduce (Watson & Hill, 2008).   
Four Forms of Mayoral Involvement  
 Kirst (2002) explained that once mayors have developed a full understanding of 
their cities and school districts in order to determine their capacity for involvement in 
education, their next decisions should be related to selecting the best type of leadership 
role. Mayoral takeovers have occurred in four forms. Mayoral involvement in education 
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can be categorized to include four different leadership styles: (a) total control, (b) partial 
control, (c) partnership relationships, and (d) low-to-medium involvement. 
Total control theory assumes that the mayor appoints all or a majority of members 
of the school board and also hires the school superintendent. In many cases, the school 
superintendent will be someone with no prior experience leading a school system. The 
school board’s role is purely consultative. District staff members are absorbed into the 
municipal bureaucracy similar to employees in other city services (Watson & Hill, 2008). 
While this theory promotes a single point of accountability, as the mayor essentially 
makes all relevant appointments, total control does have its negative consequences. 
Proponents of traditional single member school boards have expressed the belief that total 
control results in less democracy. However, “low voter turnout empowered adult 
constituencies in school districts to exercise disproportionate influence over the selection 
of board members. Today, most voters can name the mayor. Yet few can name a single 
school board member” (Duncan, 2009, p. 9).The public is used to city politics and 
representation relative to each particular region of the city. In total control theory, parents 
and citizens cannot hold appointed members accountable for their concerns and 
complaints as they normally do under traditional school boards (Usdan, 2006). Examples 
of total control theory include the public school structures in Chicago, New York City, 
and Washington, D.C.   
Wong and Shen (2003) identified total control theory cities as having a common 
integrated governance structure:  
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Integrated governance. . .has been facilitated by the following factors: (1) mayoral 
vision on outcome based accountability; (2) broad public dissatisfaction, with a 
crisis in school performance over several years preceding integrated governance; 
(3) state leadership that is dominated by Republicans, who are willing to empower 
the mayoral office to address school problems; (4) strong business support that 
has translated into adoption of corporate management practices to address 
complex bureaucratic problems in school districts; (5) weakened legitimacy of 
traditionally powerful service provider groups (unions) and service demand 
groups (racial and neighborhood-based groups). (p. 19) 
 
In subsequent research, Wong et al. (2007) set forth the vision of integrated  
governance in total control districts: 
Integrated governance is designed to give the mayor enough power to overcome 
local inertia and increase the school district’s institutional capacity in the areas of 
management efficiency, human capital, fiscal prudence, and a broadened pool of 
diverse experience. (p. 141)  
 
Watson and Hill (2008) have stated that total control theory districts, albeit having 
streamlined accountability, could potentially bring more stakeholders into the discussion 
of school improvement: 
By creating formal authority over board governance, mayoral appointment (to 
school board seats) may spur better connections between city services and 
schools. Furthermore, by expending their political capital to support the school 
system, mayors have the power to dramatically increase civic participation in 
school governance. (p. 19) 
 
Partial control theory means that mayors appoint some of the school board 
members. They, in turn, hire the superintendent and share in the responsibility of school 
budgets with the city council. Partial relationship theory calls for clear delineation 
between mayoral responsibilities and the school district. Under partial control, the mayor 
may either appoint some of the board. Under such an arrangement, the mayor may have a 
voting right on the board, yet allows the board to appoint a superintendent. This is the 
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theory under which most mayoral control school district and cities operate (Kirst & 
Edelstein, 2006). Examples of partial control include public school districts in Hartford, 
Connecticut; Providence, Rhode Island; and Indianapolis, Indiana. 
In isolated cases, the mayor may actively seek the election of a slate of school 
board candidates that share the same philosophy as he or she. This type of involvement 
carries significant risk for incumbent mayors, as all, some, or none of their slate of 
candidates may be elected. This is not a typical involvement system as mayors rarely 
infuse themselves into school board elections for obvious political risks and 
ramifications. 
The Indianapolis example has been unique. Under state law, Mayor Bart Peterson 
did not have direct authority to take over the city school system. However, the state law 
granted Peterson the authority to create and oversee charter schools within the city. 
Peterson created a record number of charter schools during his tenure within Indianapolis 
and created a quasi school system made up of charter schools. The charters directly 
competed for the students who already attended Indianapolis schools (Usdan, 2006). 
Partnership relationships reflect mayors and school superintendents working 
together on common issues. In successful partnership relationship districts, city 
governments and school districts have developed collaborative relationships without 
having to change citywide authority structures. In other words, both entities work 
together but operate as separate organizational structures (Borut, Bryant, & Houston, 
2005). Long Beach, California provides one example of partnership relationship theory. 
In Long Beach, the mayor and superintendent attend each other’s public meetings and 
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provide input. Both the mayor and superintendent agree to postpone any meeting that the 
other will not be able to attend. 
Low to medium involvement is perhaps the most prevalent of all mayoral control 
theories. Most states do not allow mayors the statutory authority to take over school 
boards. Therefore, across most of the country, there has been an understanding that 
school boards have the statutory authority to run their school districts without the 
interference or input of other public agencies or other locally elected officials. In low to 
medium involvement situations, mayors take a supportive role, largely that of consulting 
school district leadership, when new initiatives arise. In Florida, St. Petersburg’s mayor 
recognized insofar as, through consulting the school district, he could align city services 
with the help and support of the school district and that the district could align school 
district operations and opportunities with the help and support of the mayor (Usdan, 
2006).  
In line with the traditional school board structure, some mayors have 
commissioned Blue Ribbon Panels, made up of community members, policy experts, and 
school district personnel, to examine some or all facets of school district operations, 
including academic, financial, and operational components. The findings of these panels 
are nonbinding and are not subject to school board action, unless the school board 
chooses to consider implementation of recommendations. In some districts, such as 
Pittsburgh and Orange County, Florida, mayors have commissioned these panels to 
bridge the gap between school board governance and municipal governance (Wong et al., 
2007). 
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Further, along the continuum, some cities have established offices of education, 
meant to advise the mayor on issues of educational and municipal importance. The office 
is also meant to promote the city’s schools and their programs. The city of Minneapolis is 
an example of a municipality with such an office devoted exclusively to supporting 
public education within the city (Wong et al., 2007).  
Watson and Hill (2008) offered a hybrid approach to cities considering mayoral 
involvement in order to make it more palatable for apprehensive legislators or citizens.  
(Consider) using mayoral takeover as a transition strategy only, followed by 
restoration of an elected board, possibly with a more focused set of duties; 
limiting the responsibilities of the school board to hiring and firing the 
superintendent and deciding whether to replace schools, while devolving other 
hiring and spending decisions to the schools. (p. 5)  
 
Edelstein (2004) explained, from a school facility standpoint, mayors could utilize 
their political capital to either secure the funding for school facilities through private 
donors or through bond referendums which, when supported by a popular mayor, could 
pass with greater possibility than with just the political will of a school superintendent. 
Black (2008) described the Washington, D.C. school takeover in 2007 when Adrian 
Fenty was elected mayor on a platform of a complete school takeover. Upon 
inauguration, Fenty fired the existing school superintendent, Clifford Janey, and hired 
Michelle Rhee as chancellor, giving her complete control over the school system. Fenty 
and Rhee uncovered a “culture of cronyism” (Black, 2008, p. 35). As Black explained, 
Fenty and Rhee found $1 billion misappropriated for administrative and managerial 
bonuses. The new leadership recovered the $1 billion and made an initial investment in 
school facility renovation and construction. Subsequently, Fenty earmarked an additional 
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$14 billion for school construction as Rhee fired or forced the retirement of dozens of 
principals (Black, 2008). 
Mayoral Control and the Reallocation of Resources 
 Togneri and Anderson (2003) have stated that system wide school reform is a 
challenging process with the potential for political fragmentation, role conflict between 
district and school personnel, disparities in external support, inconsistent system wide 
instructional processes, and teacher attrition. Wong et al. (2007), however, have 
supported mayoral takeovers as providing the structural streamlining necessary for 
organizational efficiency within a school district and have cited Chicago as a primary 
example of organizational restructuring under mayoral control that was worth the risk. 
According to Olson (2007), a mayor’s ability to align the resources available for mid 
level administrators to execute system wide reform could yield positive results by 
principals and teachers.  
 Organizational resource reallocation has been shown to have multiple facets. 
Allowing public education to become another city service has provided some mayors 
with the flexibility to tap into various city departments to assist the public schools. In 
Chicago, Mayor Daley empowered the city parks, recreation, and library divisions to 
participate in an after school program for the public schools (Maxwell, 2009). Aligning 
resources towards student learning brought Daley much acclaim, as no other governance 
structure would have allowed for cross-pollination of municipal departments.   
38 
 
 Two common threads found in all four districts, pioneered in Chicago and evident 
in New York City, were the reallocation of resources towards teaching and learning and 
the decentralization of power. “From the vantage point of the mayor, the CEO, and other 
school administrators, the governance arrangements of earlier administrations had not 
directed enough resources at teaching and learning” (Wong et al., 2007, p. 119).  
Wong and Shen (2007) determined that the work of middle to low level 
management within a school district was crucial to the successful implementation of 
mayoral control in a district. Middle to low level managers were principals, teachers, and 
stakeholders in and around individual school communities. Watson and Hill (2008) 
described the decentralization of decision making as a core component of the success of 
mayoral control.   
New York City Schools Chancellor Joel Klein, a mayoral appointee, attempted to 
reconcile the bureaucratic forces behind district mandates with what was best for their 
schools. Bloomberg and Klein “envisioned a secondary phase of improvement efforts 
built on the core pillars of leadership, empowerment, and accountability” (as cited in 
Olson, 2007, p. 23). In short, Klein believed that decentralizing decision making and 
holding principals accountable for their decisions were ultimately the keys to successful 
organizational change. “With empowerment, we’re changing the role of the  
principal . . . The principal used to be in many ways the agent of the bureaucracy. Now, 
he is really the leader of the school” (as cited in Olson, 2007, p. 23). 
Traver (2006) explored the natural progression from centralization of resources 
and control during the initial phases of mayoral control in New York City to the eventual 
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decentralization of accountability to the school principals in exchange for higher 
expectations for performance. Traver (2006) explained that while governance changes 
could be made with limited input from stakeholder groups, mayors must engage in 
consensus building when it comes to curriculum changes. Bloomberg made a conscious 
effort to bind together the academic achievement goals in New York City so that he and 
his executive leadership team could better position themselves behind uniformity of 
standards, curriculum, and assessment.  
 In Chicago, Daley’s plan to decentralize decision making was a natural shift in 
policy. Daley took school board responsibilities, including the hiring and firing of 
principals, to Local School Councils (LSC). Each LSC represented a single school 
community (Watson & Hill, 2008). 
Unsuccessful Attempts at Mayoral Control 
Not all mayors who have aspired to control their cities’ school systems have been 
successful. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa of Los Angeles faced legal issues surrounding 
the constitutionality of his takeover attempt. As Danielson and Hochschild (1998) 
described, “education policymakers are unlikely to agree on revolutionary new strategies 
or paths of action” (p. 294). Ultimately, interpretation of the city’s charter and state 
constitution, as described by Usdan (2006), can mitigate any mayoral takeover attempt. 
Villaraigosa’s effort to assume control over the Los Angeles Unified School 
District (LAUSD) is being viewed as an uphill battle because he may need to 
secure changes in both state law and the city charter--the first time a mayor 
seeking control over public education has faced such a situation. (p. 155)  
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In some cases, mayors have assumed authority over their city’s schools only to 
turn over the operations of the district to private management companies. Philadelphia 
Mayor John Street’s decision to accept a state decision to turn over Philadelphia schools 
to Edison Schools, an Education Management Organization (EMO) ultimately had 
detrimental consequences, as Edison did not deliver sustained educational achievement. 
Baltimore also underwent an EMO experiment under Mayor Kurt Schmoke in the late 
1990s. The results were equally unsuccessful.  
Summary 
 Mayoral takeover of public school districts has been a relatively new movement. 
Therefore, there was little data or information on the topic. However, as mayors have 
initiated takeovers, researchers have used real-time data and newsworthy operational 
changes as a basis for comparing takeover districts and districts under traditional 
governance structures. As more states grant mayors the statutory authority to take over 
their schools, as voters support the changes necessary to some city charters granting 
mayors expanded authority over city schools, and as public education continues to be 
scrutinized in major metropolitan areas, the body of research on mayoral takeovers is sure 
to expand. Furthermore, the reauthorization of federal legislation raising accountability 
for individual districts, spearheaded by Secretary Duncan, a supporter of mayoral control, 
is sure to raise awareness of the benefits and drawbacks of mayoral takeover of public 
school districts. 
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 This chapter contains a description of the methodology, procedures, and 
components of the study. Both quantitative and qualitative data are used to answer the 
research questions. Most of the data collected came from the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data (CCD), public speeches, organizational 
charts, and symposium proceedings. Chapter 3 is organized into the following sections: 
(a) population, (b) data collection, (c) sources of data, (d) research questions, (e) data 
analysis, and (f) chapter summary.  
Population and Sample 
The population for the study was defined as all public school districts under some 
form of mayoral control. The sample used in this study consisted of the four largest urban 
total control theory districts as of June 30, 2009. The four districts were chosen because 
they were Total Control Theory school systems and each current mayor had initiated the 
change in school system governance. At the time of the study, the sample districts had 
been under their current governance structures for as few as two (Washington, D.C.) and 
as many as 14 years (Boston). 
The four sample districts in the study served Boston, Chicago, New York City, 
and Washington, D.C. Each of these districts transformed their school governance 
structure from traditional school board governance to some variation of total mayoral 
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control at different points in time. In each of these districts, the current mayor, either as a 
candidate, or as an established mayor, initiated the change. These districts were selected 
because of (a) their size, (b) their single point of accountability, (c) their difference in 
point in time of implementation, and (d) the common organizational and financial 
complexities of their school districts and city governments. Furthermore, Boston, 
Chicago, and New York City have had relative mayoral stability, as the mayors in each of 
these cities have been re-elected at least once. Data regarding each mayor’s years of 
service were available on the cities’ websites. The mayor in Washington, D.C., Adrian 
Fenty, was elected in 2006 to a four year term, and was the only first term mayor in this 
study. His term was set to expire in 2010.  
Data Collection 
The initial plan for this study was to use historical and present day documents 
such as organizational charts, school board meeting minutes, and speeches to identify the 
changes in organizational structures in each of the aforementioned total control school 
districts. However, the quantifiable operational and financial indicators from Wong et al. 
(2007) meant that school board meeting minutes were no longer necessary as data 
collection tools. The National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data 
(CCD) database was the primary tool for gathering operational and financial data. All 
data reported through the database was current as the 2007-2008 fiscal year. These data 
did not involve human subjects, were reported in aggregate, and were readily available 
from the federal government without special permission. Thus, the approval of the 
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University of Central Florida’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was not 
necessary.  
Sources of Data 
Data were collected primarily through the National Center for Education 
Statistics’ Common Core of Data (CCD). All data relevant to the research questions were 
accessible via the CCD and municipal websites. The study was conducted to measure 
changes pre- and post-takeover relative to organizational and financial factors. Tables 
were generated to complete longitudinal comparisons of per pupil revenues and per pupil 
expenditures in each of the four districts. The CCD database provided all organizational 
and financial indicators necessary for this study. Public perceptions were measured 
through the results of opinion polling and data compiled from major mayoral speeches 
from 2007-2010. 
Research Questions 
 Based on the review of literature, this study sought to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the operational effectiveness of 
the school district?  
2. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the financial health of public 
schools?  
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3. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the public perception of public 
schools?  
Data Analysis 
The first research question addressed the extent to which mayoral takeovers 
affected the organizational structures of the school district. One of the precipitating 
factors in mayoral takeover of schools has been the perceived operational inefficiencies 
that exist within a top-heavy school organization. Organizational efficiency can be 
measured in both financial terms and in structural changes to central office positions and 
personnel. If organizational restructuring results in additional resource reallocation to 
students and support for instruction, one would expect a higher per pupil expenditure for 
instruction, school-based support and school administration (Wong et al., 2007). Because 
each of the districts in this study had a variety of perceived organizational inefficiencies, 
especially pertaining to facility management, the analysis derived from this research 
question may not necessarily account for necessary improvements in capital outlay and 
may skew the results for districts with major facility needs.  
This study was conducted to examine per pupil expenditure, including revenue 
generated by federal grants, such as Title I, the Individuals With Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA), private grants, and other sources not generated through state and local 
revenue streams. Furthermore, this study used CCD data to determine the percentage of 
employees in various district positions pre- and post-takeover. Specifically, the researcher 
examined the percentages of all district employees who served in the following 
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capacities: teachers, aids, instructional supervisors, guidance counselors, media 
staff/librarians, district administration, and school administration. 
The second research question regarding financial health was investigated by 
examining revenue per pupil, capital outlay per pupil, the various revenue streams from 
federal, state and local sources, debt, and expenditures per student. In their 2007 study of 
indicators from 1999-2003, Wong et al, measured financial health as “total revenue – 
total expenditures ÷ total expenditures” (p. 142). This same formula was used in the 
present study to answer the second research question. Financial health was also measured 
by comparing expenditures per student.  
The third research question pertaining to public perception of mayoral control was 
able to be analyzed using multiple sources of data: (a) State of the City speeches from 
2007-2010 were reviewed for mention of public education and mayoral involvement; (b) 
election and re-election results; and (c) polls by Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, 
and local newspapers during the respective terms of each city’s mayor involved in this 
study. The review of State of the City speeches was based on the Wong et al. (2007) 
study. The leadership index used for analyzing State of the City addresses was based on 
“three elements: prioritization of education, interest in playing an active role, and desire 
to actively engage in management of the school system (Wong et al., p. 179). Table 2 
outlines guiding questions related to each of these elements. 
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Table 2  
Basic Elements of State of the City Speeches 
 
Basic Element Corresponding Question 
Prioritization of education 
 
Is public education a top priority for the city? 
Interest in playing an active role in 
local education 
 
Is the city government actively involved in 
educational programs? 
Desire to participate in managing 
school system 
Does the mayor explicitly name initiatives and 
directives for the school system? 
 
 
 Public perception is difficult to generalize to other urban school districts under 
mayoral control because the local political landscape and issues of local importance are 
typically unique to that metropolitan area or geographic region. The polling data used in 
this study did not account for margin of error or sample size of the poll. Table 3 indicates 
the study domains, corresponding research questions, and sources of data which were 
used in the analyses. 
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Table 3  
Study Domains, Research Questions and Data Sources 
 
Study Domain Research Question Data Source 
Operational 
Effectiveness 
To what extent do mayoral 
takeovers affect the operational 
effectiveness of the school district?  
 
Common Core of Data 
(CCD) 
Financial Health To what extent do mayoral 
takeovers affect the financial health 
of public schools?  
 
Common Core of Data 
(CCD) 
Public Perception To what extent do mayoral 
takeovers affect the public 
perception of public schools?  
 
Quinnipiac University 
Polling Center 
 
Washington Post 
 
State of the City Speeches 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the population and sample, data collection procedures, 
sources of data, research questions, and data analysis procedures. In this study, the 
researcher looked for patterns in changes to organizational structures, financial health, 
and public perception that might be applicable and of interest to other mayors and policy 
makers investigating the results of total control theory in a large urban school district.  
Chapter 4 contains a report of the analysis of the data. Chapter 5 concludes the 
study with a summary and discussion of the findings, implications for policy and practice 
and recommendations for future study. 
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CHAPTER 4  
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Introduction 
 The previous chapters have explained the purpose, provided a theoretical 
framework for the existing research, and developed the preparation of the study. Chapter 
1 presented the problem to be studied and provided a brief overview of the study. Chapter 
2 shared the existing literature on this topic. Chapter 3 detailed the methodology used to 
gather data. Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the data collected. Through the analysis of 
the data, it was hoped that trends and certain data of the four school districts in this study 
could either be replicated in other mayoral control districts or be extracted by non 
mayoral control districts as positive, operational or financial practices. Furthermore, it 
was hoped that the data collected regarding public perception of mayoral takeover would 
determine a dedicated set of political characteristics that could be replicated in cities 
considering total mayoral control. 
 Data that were analyzed were separated individually depending on the research 
question studied. Data for the first two research questions were extracted from the CCD 
website and placed in separate Microsoft Excel files. Data for the third research question 
were collected from local newspapers, city records, and the Quinnipiac University 
Polling Center and entered into a Microsoft excel file for further analysis. 
 The first two research questions were analyzed based on the data sets from the 
year prior to mayoral takeover and the most recent fiscal year for which data were 
available, 2008. Because the research questions were designed to compare the four 
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districts, the fact that Research Questions 1 and 2 compared different sets of years was 
inconsequential, as ratios were compared rather than raw data. In each set of data, 
formulas using components of each data set were used to measure operational and 
financial effectiveness. The third research question was used to examine recent speeches 
and polling data no earlier than 2007. Such longitudinal data is the equivalent of an entire 
election cycle within each of the four cities. The goal in presenting the analysis of the 
data was to answer the research questions by determining trends and practices unique to 
mayoral control districts relative to each other pre-takeover.   
Research Question 1 
To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the operational effectiveness of the 
school district? 
 
 Total expenditures per pupil is a measure of instructional related expenditures and 
non instructional expenditures. Instructional related expenditures include teacher, 
librarian, resource support, curriculum developer, and teacher aide salaries, and any other 
expenditure directly related to classroom instruction including textbooks, assessment 
tools and technology (NCES, 2010). Non instructional expenditures include school-based 
and district administrator salaries, food service, transportation, funding for private 
schools, community service, enterprise operations, and maintenance and facility 
operations. While this measure is dependent upon several economic environmental 
factors including the consumer price index, inflation (or deflation), and local and state tax 
revenues, an increase in total expenditures per pupil is indicative of greater revenues. In 
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some cases, an increase in total expenditures is directly related to an increase in capital 
outlay as facility improvements represent a major cost. As it relates to total and 
instructional expenditures, the researcher can only report what the districts purport and 
would not presume the accuracy of the data. 
 Table 4 displays the total expenditures per pupil pre and post mayoral takeover 
for the four cities that were the focus of this research. The District of Columbia had a 
35% increase in total expenditures per pupil pre- to post-takeover, which was only three 
years, a large increase in a short period of time. Coincidentally, in 2007, the District of 
Columbia initiated a $1 billion capital project to improve school facilities.   
 
 
Table 4  
Total Expenditures per Pupil Pre and Post Mayoral Takeover 
 
District 
a
Takeover 
Status 
Year Total Expenditures  
Per Pupil 
Boston Pre (1991) 1991   7,219 
 Post 2008 21,801 
    
Chicago Pre (1995) 1995   6,376 
 Post 2008 11,051 
    
District of Columbia (DC) Pre (2005) 2005 12,979 
 Post 2008 20,029 
    
New York City Pre (2001) 2001 13,566 
 Post 2008 20,162 
 
Note. Per pupil expenditures are reported in dollars. 
a
Pre and post takeover data does not control for inflation, consumer price index (CPI), and other variances 
in financial controls in the actual reported dollar amount 
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 Boston had the largest increase pre to post takeover, both in percentage increase 
(300%) and real per pupil expenditure ($14,582), over a 17-year period. Chicago 
increased $4,675 per pupil over a 13-year period. The District of Columbia increased 
$7,050 over a three year period. And New York City increased $6,596 over a seven year 
period. 
Table 4 also shows a clear difference and substantially lower per pupil 
expenditures in 2008 between Chicago and the three other cities in this study. Though the 
data presented in Table 4 can be a politically advantageous metric by which to measure a 
mayor’s commitment to education, total instructional-related expenditures per pupil is a 
more accurate measure of whether true organizational structures shift from significant 
administrative costs due to organization structural inefficiencies towards a reallocation of 
resources back to schools under mayoral control.  
One of the main precipitating factors of mayoral control is the perceived 
organizational inefficiencies brought on by top heavy school districts with high 
administrative overhead. If a true resource reallocation towards schools occurs, 
significant increases in instructional related expenditures per pupil should occur. Table 5 
provides a closer look at changes in instructional expenditures per pupil pre and post 
takeover. 
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Table 5  
Total Instructional Expenditures per Pupil Pre and Post Mayoral Takeover 
 
District 
a
Takeover 
Status 
Year Instructional 
Expenditures  
Per Pupil 
Boston Pre (1991) 1991   4,065 
 Post 2008 12,410 
    
Chicago Pre (1995) 1995   3,697 
 Post 2008   5,774 
    
District of Columbia (DC) Pre (2005) 2005   6,567 
 Post 2008   8,640 
    
New York City Pre (2001) 2001   8,270 
 Post 2008 13,159 
 
Note. Instructional expenditures per student are reported in dollars. 
a
Pre and post takeover data does not control for inflation, consumer price index (CPI), and other variances 
in financial controls in the actual reported dollar amount 
 
 
 
 All four districts showed increases in instructional related expenditures per pupil. 
Boston increased the most of the four districts studied in total per pupil instructional 
related expenditures ($8,345), over a 17-year period. Chicago showed an increase of 
$2,077 over a 13-year period. The District of Columbia increased $2,073 over a three 
year period. In addition, the District of Columbia’s increase over three years was four 
dollars less than Chicago’s increase over a much longer period of time. New York City 
increased $4,889 over a seven year period. Table 6 displays the percentage of total 
expenditures per pupil reserved for instruction-related services. 
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Table 6  
Percentage of Total Expenditures Per Pupil Reserved for Instruction-Related Services 
 
District 
a
Takeover 
Status 
Year Total Per Pupil 
Expenditure 
Total and Total % 
Per Pupil Instructional 
Expenditures 
Boston Pre  1991    7,656    4,041 53% 
 Post 2008 21,801 12,410 57% 
      
Chicago Pre 1995   6,376   3,697 58% 
 Post 2008 11,051   5,774 52% 
      
District of Columbia (DC) Pre 2005 12,979   6,567 51% 
 Post 2008 20,029   8,640 43% 
      
New York City Pre 2001 13,566   8,270 61% 
 Post 2008 20,062 13,159 66% 
 
Note. Expenditures are reported in dollars. 
a
Pre and post takeover data does not control for inflation, consumer price index (CPI), and other variances 
in financial controls in the actual reported dollar amount 
 
 
Boston increased its percentage of total expenditures per pupil reserved for 
instruction-related services, pre to post takeover, by 4%. Chicago decreased its 
percentage of total expenditures reserved for instructional related services, pre to post 
takeover, by 6%. The District of Columbia decreased its percentage of total expenditures 
for instructional related services, pre to post takeover, by 8%. New York City increased 
its percentage of total expenditures for instructional related services, pre to post takeover, 
by 5%. Therefore, only Boston and New York City experienced increases in total 
expenditures reserved for instructional related services. 
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For comparison, the average percentage of total instructional expenditures per 
pupil among the 100 largest school districts in the United States, of which the four 
districts in this study were included, was 52% in 2008 (NCES, 2009). 
 The differentials between percentage of total expenditures used for instructional 
related services were higher in New York City than in any of the other districts in this 
study. New York City had the highest percentage of total expenditures dedicated to 
instructional related expenditures among all districts in the 100 largest school districts in 
fiscal year 2008. When examining the pre and post data, decreases for both the District of 
Columbia (51% to 43%) and Chicago (58% to 52%) were shown in the percentages of 
total expenditures per pupil used for instructional related services. The District of 
Columbia’s aforementioned facility improvement project in 2007 accounted for a 
disproportionate amount of expenditures to improve school facilities. No such project or 
any other comparable project identified through this study was initiated in Chicago to 
explain the drop in expenditures per pupil for instructional related services for that city. 
 
Research Question 2 
To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the financial health of public schools? 
 
 The financial health of public school districts has not only been a precipitating 
factor for mayoral control but also has served as a metric by which the public determines 
successful reform within their public schools. Tables 7-10 combine several financial 
benchmarks: (a) revenue sources, (b) Return on Investment (ROI), (c) interest paid on 
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school debt, and (d) capital outlay as a percentage of total annual expenditures. Though 
each benchmark may carry different weight depending on the mayoral priorities in each 
city, these four benchmarks have been presented to generalize the financial condition of 
each school district in this study. Each of the financial benchmarks were made available 
by the National Center of Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data (CCD). Just as in 
Research Question 1, for expenditure and revenue data, the researcher can only report 
what the district purported and did not presume the accuracy of the data. 
 All four cities experienced an increase in total revenue pre to post takeover. 
Revenue totals shown in Table 7 did not account for inflation or deflation. The revenue 
generation shown was consistent with city size and number of students per district. 
Chicago had the only increase in federal revenue in 2008 compared to fiscal year 2007.  
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Table 7  
Revenue by Source: Pre and Post Mayoral Takeover 
 
a
District Revenue Source 
 Federal State Local 
Boston    
Pre (1991)      41,182    126,650    266,257 
Post (2008)      91,360    393,426    828,582 
    
Chicago    
Pre (1995)   351,759    933,461 1,630,017 
Post (2008)   808,902 1,845,925 2,189,789 
    
b
District of 
Columbia 
   
Pre (2005)   167,922 
a
    941,683 
Post (2008)     85,568 
a
 1,138,744 
    
New York City    
Pre (2001) 1,016,645 5,872,276 5,163,075 
Post (2008) 1,785,145 9,335,189 8,765,359 
 
Note. Revenue is reported in thousands of dollars. 
a
Pre and post takeover data does not control for inflation, consumer price index (CPI), and other variances 
in financial controls in the actual reported dollar amount. 
b
The District of Columbia does not receive state funding because it is not part of a state. 
 
 All four districts increased in each of the revenue sources pre to post takeover. 
The largest increase took place in New York City, in both State and Local funding 
sources.  
Revenues by revenue source are important because some mayors and mayoral 
candidates often espouse their ability to secure extra federal funding and exert political 
influence over sales tax increases, property tax increases, and other revenue generating 
initiatives (local revenue sources). Among the four largest total control theory districts, 
there appeared to be little to no difference in the federal funding secured by the school 
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districts researched and other school districts in the largest 100 school districts in the 
nation.  
During capital budgeting, companies compare the return on investment (ROI) of 
different projects to select which projects to pursue in order to generate maximum return 
on equity for the company's stockholders. In this study, the return on investment was 
used as the primary determinant of financial health of a school district, a measure of 
comparing revenues to expenditures. It is displayed in Table 8. 
 
Table 8  
Return on Investment (ROI) Pre and Post Mayoral Takeover 
 
b
Takeover Status Total Revenue Total Current 
Expenditures 
a
ROI 
Boston    
Pre (1991)       434,089       423,554   2.5% 
Post (2008)     1,313,368    1,141,536 15.1% 
    
Chicago    
Pre (1995)     2,915,237    2,469,471 18.1% 
Post (2008)     4,844,616    4,235,025 14.4% 
    
District of Columbia    
Pre (2005)     1,109,605       808,665 37.2% 
Post (2008)     1,224,312       849,259 44.1% 
    
New York City    
Pre (2001)   12,051,995   11,851,342   1.7% 
Post (2008)   19,885,693   17,742,868 12.0% 
    
100 Largest School Districts    
2007 130,166,026 132,408,186  -1.6% 
 
Note. Revenue is reported in thousands of dollars.  
a
Return on Investment (ROI) is reported as a percentage. 
b
Pre and post takeover data does not control for inflation, consumer price index (CPI), and other variances 
in financial controls in the actual reported dollar amount 
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The return on investment measure did not account for differentials of recurring or non-
recurring revenues or expenditures, as the NCES did not name those revenues or 
expenditures by recurring or non-recurring. The greatest differential of return on 
investment gain occurred in Boston and New York City. While all four total control 
districts exceeded mean ROI of the 100 largest school districts (2007 data), Chicago 
showed an ROI differential of -3.7, the only ROI loss among the four districts in the 
study, pre to post takeover. The District of Columbia had the highest overall ROI in fiscal 
year 2008. The only explanation for the significant difference in ROI in the District of 
Columbia is the lack of a State revenue stream, the only major market differential 
between it and the other districts in this study. Consistent with the districts that 
demonstrated the highest organizational effectiveness as measured in research question 1, 
the same two districts, Boston and New York City have the highest ROI differentials, 
12.6% and 10.3%, respectively, between pre and post takeover in Table 8.  
 One precipitating factor of mayoral takeover is the perceived financial 
mismanagement of school district debt. This indicator can affect credit worthiness, bond 
ratings, the method government entities use to raise money, existing interest rates districts 
pay on debt, the ability to sell depreciating assets, favorable rebates from potential 
lenders and procurement-related functions of the school district, such as purchasing good 
and services on credit. Interest on school debt for the four districts is presented in Table 
9.  
59 
 
Table 9  
Changes in Interest on School Debt 
___________________________________________________________________ 
b
Takeover Status Interest on  
School Debt 
Total Expenditures aInterest on 
School Debt 
(%) 
Boston    
Pre (1991)     8,436       423,554   2.0% 
Post (2008)   13,442    1,141,536   1.2% 
    
Chicago    
Pre (1995)        333    2,469,471 <0.1% 
Post (2008) 180,767    4,235,025   4.3% 
    
District of Columbia    
Pre (2005) 0      808,665 0 
Post (2008) 0      849,259 0 
    
New York City    
Pre (2001) 344,457 11,851,342   2.9% 
Post (2008) 400,000 17,742,868   2.2% 
 
Note. Interest on school debt and total expenditures are reported in thousands of dollars.
 
a
Interest on school debt is reported as a percentage of total expenditures. 
b
Pre and post takeover data does not control for inflation, consumer price index (CPI), and other variances 
in financial controls in the actual reported dollar amount 
 
 Reducing interest payments on school debt is a good indicator of the district’s 
flexibility in reducing interest rates on outstanding debts and improves the district’s 
debt/expenditure ratio. Debt/expenditure ratio is the percentage of total expenditures 
made for interest payments related to school debt. Though the District of Columbia 
school district has been bound by law to balance its budget from year to year, the three 
other districts in this study were not bound by the same regulation. Boston and New York 
City reduced their percentages of total expenditures dedicated to interest paid on school 
debt by .8% and .7% respectively, Chicago increased its percentage of total expenditures 
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dedicated to interest paid on school debt by 4.2%. Based on the data displayed in Table 9, 
the District of Columbia was in the best position with no interest on debt. The reduction 
of debt in New York City and Boston is, however, worthy of note. Chicago’s increase in 
interest paid on school debt is high, given that its existing increase of 4.2% is greater than 
Boston’s and New York City’s pre takeover debt combined.   
 In order to determine whether other financial indicators may be explained by 
major capital improvement projects, capital outlay as a percentage of total expenditures 
was also investigated in this study. In many cases, mayoral involvement in schools can be 
partially attributed to the public perception of conditions of school facilities. Therefore, 
mayors can look at capital improvements to school facilities as a public metric of 
improvement made to schools. The results of this aspect of the analyses are presented in 
Table 10.  
Capital outlay can contribute valuable information regarding the financial health 
of a school district. A high percentage of capital outlay may have implications for 
instructional related services. Facility improvements and upgrades to existing school 
infrastructure may have important implications related to technology. Mayors’ 
predispositions towards an increase in percentage of expenditures for capital outlay 
projects can convey the vision and purpose they, as leaders, have for their school 
systems.  
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Table 10  
Capital Outlay Percentage Increase Pre and Post Takeover 
_______________________________________________________ 
a
Takeover Status Capital Outlay Capital Outlay 
Percentage Increase 
Boston   
Pre (1991)        4,356   1.0% 
Post (2008)      36,418   3.1% 
   
Chicago   
Pre (1995)      58,097   2.4% 
Post (2008)    322,333   7.6% 
   
District of Columbia   
Pre (2005)    134,417 16.6% 
Post (2008)    167,103 19.7% 
   
New York City   
Pre (2001) 2,002,823 16.9% 
Post (2008 2,208,816 12.4% 
 
Note. Capital outlay is reported in thousands of dollars 
a
Pre and post takeover data does not control for inflation, consumer price index (CPI), and other variances 
in financial controls in the actual reported dollar amount 
 
 
Boston reported an increase in capital outlay of 2.1%. Chicago reported the 
largest increase in capital outlay (5.2%). The District of Columbia reported an increase of 
3.1%. The District of Columbia also had the highest capital outlay percentage of all four 
districts in 2008 (19.7%). New York City reported the only decrease in percentage of 
total expenditures dedicated to capital outlay (-4.5%). 
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Research Question 3 
To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the public perception of public 
schools?  
 
The third research question dealt with public perception of mayoral takeover and 
whether mayoral takeover of public schools was a risky political calculation for mayors. 
This question was answered using multiple sources of data: (a) State of the City speeches 
from 2007-2010 were reviewed for mention of public education and mayoral 
involvement; (b) election and re-election results; and (c) polls by Quinnipiac University 
Polling Institute, and local newspapers during the respective terms of each city’s mayor 
involved in this study.  
Analysis of State of the City Speeches 
Tables 11-14 provide data obtained from a review of State of the City speeches 
for each of the four cities that were the focus of this study. Speeches were reviewed for 
the following five elements: (a) explicit mention of education as a top priority, (b) 
explicit interest in playing an active role, (c) number of references to education/schools in 
speech, (d) highest number of references to another city program/service, and (e) mention 
of education/schools within first 250 words. 
An explicit mention of education in a State of the City speech as a top priority 
meant that the mayors, in their speeches, actually used the term, “priority,” when 
describing their education plans for that year. An explicit interest in playing an active role 
63 
 
in education meant that the mayors, in the given year’s speeches, described how they 
would personally be involved in education that year.  
To obtain the number of references to education/schools, the researcher counted 
and reported the mayors’ use of the words “schools,” “students,” and “education” in each 
year’s speeches. A mention of any of these education-related terms qualified as a 
reference.  
To determine the highest number of references to another single city 
program/service, the words “public safety,” “housing,” and “budgets” were counted and 
totaled. A word count was performed in order to determine whether the first mention of 
education occurred in the first 250 words of the text of the speech. If this occurred, it 
indicated that education was the first city program mentioned in a State of the City 
speech.  
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Table 11  
Qualitative Analysis: Boston State of the City Speech 
 
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Explicit mention of education as a top priority 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explicit interest in playing an active role 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of references to education/schools in 
speech 
 
10 13 10 10 
Highest number of references to another city 
program/service 
 
10 14 13 11 
Mention of education/schools within first 250 
words 
No No No No 
 
Note. Boston’s State of the City speech in 2010 was not given. The mayor’s inaugural speech after re-
election was given in its place. 
 
 
 
Table 12  
Qualitative Analysis: Chicago State of the City Speech 
 
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Explicit mention of education as a top priority 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explicit interest in playing an active role 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of references to education/schools in 
speech 
 
21 29 15 27 
Highest number of references to another city 
program/service 
 
13 12 14 17 
Mention of education/schools within first 250 
words 
No Yes No Yes 
 
Note. The 2007 Inaugural Address supplanted the State of the City Address that year. 
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Table 13 Qualitative Analysis:  
District of Columbia State of the City Speech 
 
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Explicit mention of education as a top priority 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explicit interest in playing an active role 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of references to education/schools in 
speech 
 
16 8 11 7 
Highest number of references to another city 
program/service 
 
19 11 8 5 
Mention of education/schools within first 250 
words 
No Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
Table 14  
Qualitative Analysis: New York City State of the City Speech 
 
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Explicit mention of education as a top priority 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Explicit interest in playing an active role 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of references to education/schools in 
speech 
 
15 6 7 13 
Highest number of references to another city 
program/service 
 
10 11 15 7 
Mention of education/schools within first 250 
words 
No No No No 
 
 
 Each of the four districts, over the four year period of speeches, all explicitly 
mentioned education as a top priority of the incumbent’s administration. Each mayor 
66 
 
explicitly stated his desire to play an active role in the leadership and management of his 
city’s school system. Though Mayor Daley of Chicago had more mentions of 
education/schools than any other city service or policy initiative, Mayor Menino did not 
mention education, in any of his four speeches over the same period of time, more than 
other city services or policy initiatives. In both the District of Columbia and New York 
City, each mayor had two years of mentioning education more than other city services or 
policy initiatives and two years of mentioning another priority more frequently. In three 
of the four years of data, Mayor Fenty mentioned education within the first 250 words of 
the speech on three occasions. Mayor Daley mentioned education, as early, twice. Neither 
Mayor Bloomberg nor Mayor Menino mentioned education within the first 250 words of 
any of their four State of the City speeches between 2007-2010. 
Election and Re-election Results 
 This study has been conducted in part, to isolate the mayors’ leadership over 
public education as either a reason for reelection or possibly a vote for an opposing 
candidate. No research exists that either proves or disproves that the public in any of the 
four districts in this study has voted for mayor based on public education or any other 
single issue. 
Polling Data and Public Perception 
Prior to Michael Bloomberg’s reelection in 2009, the Quinnipiac University 
Polling Institute released results of a poll indicating that, by a 56%-32% margin, poll 
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respondents responded favorably when asked about their opinion of mayoral control of 
public schools in New York City under Mayor Bloomberg. In the same poll, voters were 
asked, by party affiliation, whether mayoral control of New York City schools was a 
success. Democratic and Republican respondents approved (51%) and disapproved (37%) 
in equal numbers of Bloomberg’s handling of public schools. Along racial lines, white 
respondents, black respondents, and Hispanic respondents all expressed opinions that the 
mayoral takeover of schools had been a success. The trending data outlined in the 2009 
poll report, revealed a public opinion approval increase of 21 percentage points, from 
35% approval in May 2003 to 56% approval in July 2008.   
Polling data did not show that public perception was swayed significantly 
immediately following a state of the city address. In the Quinnipiac Poll, Mayor 
Bloomberg had a higher approval rating in handling the public schools in July 2008 than 
he did in January 2009, immediately following the State of the City speech. No major 
policy shifts were announced within a month of each of these polling dates. 
Another question from the same poll asked respondents to rank certain issues, in 
order of importance that influenced their vote for mayor. The economy held a 32 point 
advantage over education. However, education was ranked second highest as the single 
most important issue in the respondents’ vote for mayor that year. Education was 16 
points higher than crime, 12 points higher than taxes, and 11 points higher than mass 
transit. 
The Quinnipiac University Polling Institute’s poll also concluded that voters 
approved of New York City Schools Chancellor Joel Klein by a margin of 37%-35%, 
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with 28% indicating they were undecided. This approval polling data were slightly down 
from previous polls in early 2009 and late 2008.  
In the weeks leading up to the 2010 mayoral election in the District of Columbia, 
Mayor Adrian Fenty, down in the polls at the time, dispatched Michelle Rhee, Fenty’s 
appointed chancellor, to campaign for his re-election. In an overly Democratic city, 
registered Democrats were almost equally divided with 41% indicating that Chancellor 
Rhee was a reason to vote for Fenty, and 40% stating she was a reason to vote against 
Fenty. Ultimately, the clear preference of white voters in the city, who clearly supported 
Rhee’s leadership of the school system was in stark contrast to the lack of support among 
the city’s black voters who comprised the overwhelming majority of voters in the city 
(Stewart & Craig, 2010).  
Summary 
Chapter 4 focused on the analyses of data. First, indicators of operational 
effectiveness were analyzed and compared between the four districts studied. Operational 
effectiveness was measured by: (a) total expenditures by pupil, (b) instructional 
expenditures by pupil, (c) and the percentage of total expenditures per pupil made up of 
instructional related expenditures per pupil. Second, indicators of financial effectiveness 
were analyzed and compared between the four districts. Financial effectiveness was 
measured by: (a) total revenue, (b) return on investment (ROI), (c) interest on school debt 
as a percentage of total expenditures, (d) and capital outlay as a percentage of total 
expenditures. Third, the priority placed on public education was measured by comparing 
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data from each of the State of the City speeches given during the most recent four year 
period (2007-10), the equivalent of an election cycle. Furthermore, in cities where the 
data were available, polling data prior to mayoral elections was shared. 
Chapter 5, the final chapter, will articulate findings from this chapter in greater 
detail. Each of the three research questions will be summarized and discussed, and 
conclusions will be shared. Chapter 5 will also present recommendations for future study 
and implications for municipalities considering this type of school governance structure. 
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CHAPTER 5  
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of mayoral takeover on the 
operational and financial structures of school districts. This study focused on a variety of 
operational and financial factors including expenditures in aggregate terms, per pupil 
expenditures, revenue in aggregate, revenue types, return on investment (ROI), interest 
on school debt, and capital outlay. In addition, this study focused on the relationship 
between politics and education, examining polling and mayoral speech data as ancillary 
but important factors in determining the perceived and actual success of mayoral takeover 
of public schools.  
 Chapter Five will focus on summarizing the study’s findings. The results of each 
research question will be discussed. Furthermore, recommendations for future research 
will be shared. Chapter Five will conclude with implications and recommendations for 
municipalities and city leaders considering mayoral takeover, in the initial stages of 
mayoral takeover, or recently elected administrations considering their own education 
policies when they replace mayors who have already pioneered mayoral takeover of 
schools in their own cities. 
Statement of the Problem 
 This study sought to identify the changes in operational and financial structures 
pre and post mayoral takeover. Furthermore, this study sought to determine whether 
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mayoral control serves as a successful school governance structure. This research will 
provide a framework by which mayors can benchmark operational and financial 
structures throughout their control of the school system.  
Methodology 
 This was a mixed method study, using both qualitative and quantitative data, in 
order to develop a cross section of measurable operational and financial benchmarks for 
schools under mayoral control. Furthermore, data from polls and from State of the City 
speeches were used to determine how the infusing education into city politics either 
worked to help re-elect mayors and re-authorize mayoral control as a school governance 
structure. 
 This study focused on the four largest total control districts: Boston, Chicago, 
Washington, D.C. (also referred to as the District of Columbia), and New York City. The 
mayors in each of the four cities control the school system, participate in education 
policy, and ran for re-election at least once on their respective records, including their 
control of education. Each of the four cities studied are included in the National Center 
for Education Statistics’ (NCES) annual report on the 100 largest school systems in the 
United States (US).  
 The data for the first two research questions were found in the NCES Common 
Core of Data (CCD), part of the US Department of Education. Because no human 
subjects were used in the data and all data used in this study were previously published 
either by government agencies, municipal websites, polling centers, journals and 
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periodicals, IRB approval was not necessary. Data were shared for the year previous to 
mayoral control and the most recent year for which data were available, fiscal year 2008. 
 For State of the City speech data not available via the city website, a Freedom of 
Information Act request was made. This request can be viewed in Appendix A. 
Data Analysis 
 This study was guided by the following three research questions. 
1. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the operational effectiveness of 
the school district?  
2. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the financial health of public 
schools?  
3. To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the public perception of public 
schools?  
Research Question 1 
 
To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the operational effectiveness of the 
school district?  
 
 The analysis of data for RQ1 was based on the quantification of operational data. 
In this study, operational data were identified through disaggregating expenditure data, 
both in aggregate form and as exclusively instructional-related data. In this study, 
operational effectiveness was defined as reducing organizational overhead and 
reallocating resources within the school system towards instruction and instruction 
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related services. This study did not account for inflation between pre and post takeover 
expenditures. Table 4 covered the total per pupil expenditure in the year prior to takeover 
year and the per pupil expenditure in 2008. Table 5 listed the per pupil instructional-
related expenditure in the year prior to takeover and in 2008.  
Table 5 also reveals information relevant to changes to operational effectiveness. 
Boston experienced the highest growth of per pupil instructional expenditures pre 
takeover to post takeover (300%). New York City experienced the second highest growth 
(37%). Chicago experienced the third highest growth (36%). The District of Columbia 
experienced the lowest growth of the four districts in per pupil instructional expenditures  
(25%). While Chicago and New York City increased comparable percentages pre 
takeover to post takeover, New York City experienced their increases in six fewer years 
than Chicago. 
Table 6 combined the data from Table 4 and Table 5 to show whether there was 
an increase in the percentage of per pupil expenditures in instructional-related areas. The 
data in Table 6 clearly shows the very resource reallocation break towards instructional 
related expenditures that this study defines as effective organizational structural 
realignment took place most effectively in New York City. Also, New York City’s 
overall standing among the 100 largest districts in terms of percentage of total 
expenditures earmarked for instructional related services is a primary indicator of 
successful mayoral involvement in organizational realignment. Boston also showed an 
increase over time. Boston’s standing among the 100 largest public school districts also 
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places in the top quartile of percentage of total expenditures earmarked for instructional 
related services.  
Instructional-related expenditures as a function of total expenditures is a primary 
indicator of reduced overhead and administrative costs. One of the precipitating factors of 
mayoral takeover discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 is the perceived operational inefficiencies 
of a top heavy school district, the glut that keeps revenue from being expended on 
instructional personnel and resources. According to the measure used in this study, 
mayoral takeover has helped reallocate resources toward instruction and thus reduce 
administrative overhead, in New York City and Boston. Chicago experienced a decrease 
in total expenditures per pupil for instructional-related services in their pretakeover year 
of 1995 (58%) to 2008 (52%), a decrease of 6%. The District of Columbia experienced 
an 8 percent decrease in total expenditures per pupil for instructional-related services 
between their pretakeover year of 2005 and 2008 (51% to 43%). The aforementioned 
resource reallocation toward facility renovation in 2007 and 2008 in the District of 
Columbia may have explained their decrease in per pupil expenditure for instructional 
related services between pretakeover and 2008. 
Research Question 2 
To what extent do mayoral takeovers affect the financial health of public schools? 
Financial health can be quantified by revenue, ROI, debt and capital outlay. When 
examining total revenue, all four districts have experienced increases in total revenue, 
mostly from increases in local funding sources, namely property taxes. All four districts 
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reside in municipalities that have experienced little to no effect from existing property 
depreciation that is encompassing most areas of the country. While other cities with large 
school districts rely heavily on federal and state revenues to replace shortfalls blamed on 
increased home foreclosures and declining property values, the four cities in this study 
have largely been unaffected by declining local revenues. Property tax generation remain 
a primary indicator of financial solvency as local revenues represent the largest revenue 
source for all school districts. The importance of local revenues is underscored by the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, commonly referred to as the stimulus 
bill. This bill aimed to infuse money in states with declining revenues for institutions 
normally funded by state and local revenues, like schools. 
Table 8 represents ROI measures on each of the four districts. New York City and 
Boston have the highest gain in ROI pre takeover to post takeover. Washington, D.C. has 
the highest overall ROI (37.4% to 44.1%), which is due in large part to having one fewer 
revenue source than the other districts. Chicago has the lowest ROI change pre takeover 
to post takeover of the four districts (-3.7%). However, all four districts have a higher 
ROI in fiscal year 2008 than the mean of the 100 largest districts in 2007 (-1.6%).  
Table 9 represents interest paid annually on school debt as a percentage of total 
expenditures. Boston and New York City both decreased the percentage of expenditures 
accounting for interest payments on school debt. Chicago increased its interest paid on 
school debt pre takeover to post takeover and the District of Columbia balances its budget 
each year and does not carry any debt from year to year.  
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Table 10 represents resources dedicated to capital outlay. Chicago showed the 
greatest increase pre takeover to post takeover in percentage of total expenditures for 
capital outlay.  
Based on the four measures used to define financial health, Boston and New York 
City represent the greatest increase in financial health pre takeover and post takeover due 
to ROI increases over time and reductions in interest on school debt. The District of 
Columbia is the most recent of all four districts to experience takeover and has begun to 
move in a similar direction as Boston and New York City. Chicago has been under total 
mayoral control longer than all districts except Boston, and has seen a decrease in ROI 
and an increase in interest paid on school debt, both negative signs for financial health. 
Summary and Discussion of Findings 
 This study was designed to determine which total control theory school districts 
among the 100 largest school districts in the U.S. have effectively managed the 
operational and financial components during takeover. The three research questions 
focused on operational, financial, and political aspects of school district leadership from 
the mayor’s office. Operationally, the reduction in administrative overhead, as measured 
by reallocating expenditures for instructional related services, was measured to determine 
if mayoral involvement in school district leadership streamlined resources out of the 
central office and back to the schools.  
Financially, the study focused on several factors including revenue sources, total 
revenue, ROI, interest paid on school debt, and capital outlay as a percentage of total 
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annual expenditures, to determine, if among the four measures, each of the four mayors 
have effectively managed the capital in their respective school districts.  
Politically, the study focused on both polling data where available and State of the 
City speeches over the last four years, to determine the priority placed on education 
relative to other city priorities. 
Operationally, New York City and Boston had the highest reallocation of 
expenditures for instructional related services. Chicago had the lowest of all four districts. 
Therefore, Boston and New York City were found to be the most operationally 
effectiveness defined by the measure used in this study. As mentioned earlier, operational 
effectiveness can be defined by percentage of total expenditures used for instructional 
related services. Mayors in New York City and Boston could articulate that they have 
effectively reallocated resources away from the central office and back to schoolhouses. 
Financially, the study targeted four key benchmarks in each of the four districts. 
All four districts had an increase in total revenue pre to post takeover, with Chicago 
showing the only increase in federal funding of the four districts studied, between fiscal 
year 2007 to fiscal year 2008. New York City and Boston showed the highest increase in 
ROI, and had the largest decrease in interest paid on school debt as a percentage of total 
expenditures. The District of Columbia had the highest overall ROI in 2008. Chicago had 
the largest increase in interest paid on school debt of the four district studied. When 
investigating capital outlay, Chicago had the highest percentage increase, while Boston 
had the lowest overall capital outlay as a percentage of total annual expenditures in 2008.  
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Each total control theory school district will be at the mercy of a mayor’s 
priorities. In some cases, as was the case in the District of Columbia, capital outlay is a 
major priority given the condition of school buildings at the onset of mayoral takeover. 
However, the overall indicator of financial success is ROI, as it accounts for all monies 
coming into the district and leaving the district.  
Politically, the State of the City speech data showed the most amount of parity. 
The mayors in each of the four cities work in different political climates and ultimately 
speak to most pressing issues in the cities. Their speeches differed in length, style and 
timing in the calendar year. However, each mayor consistently stated the public education 
was a priority of their administrations. Mentions of public education or education related 
terms were as popular as mentions of other city services such as public safety, budgets, 
public health, and other community based services. Ultimately, State of the Speech data 
had no effect on public perception of mayoral takeover, as polling data did not show a 
difference in approval among voters when asked about the mayors handling of public 
education in months when the mayor delivered a state of the city address.  
The polling data made available in New York City and the District of Columbia 
was particularly telling. New York City citizens overwhelmingly approved of the 
mayor’s control of that city’s public schools, whereas the District of Columbia voters 
were decidedly divided, along racial lines, about the success of public school reform in 
that city. The polling data revealed that mayoral control is a divisive issue and the 
appointment of a school superintendent or chancellor is an appointment that can make or 
break re-election. Danielson and Hochschild’s (1998) claim that municipal political 
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climates are not naturally set up for coalition building around educational reform, was no 
more evident than in the District of Columbia. However, New York City, perhaps the 
most diverse of all North American cities, in terms of politics and cultural backgrounds, 
disproved their assertion that mayoral takeover is unsustainable. Therefore, it could be 
argued that it depends on the city’s background, the mayor’s perceived ability to govern, 
and the timeline by which reforms are put in place. Kirst (2002) predicted the demise of 
total control mayors like Fenty, who alienated constituencies that supported his election 
such as the teacher unions and other labor friendly groups. 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 Mayoral control is sure to expand as a popular school governance reform 
structure. As new candidates run for municipal office and State Statutes are revised by 
legislators insistent upon changing the establishment system for governing schools, 
formal metrics will become more common to baseline school district processes pre and 
post mayoral takeover. In response to the review of literature and the analysis of data, the 
following conclusions were drawn (in no particular order of importance): 
1. Instances of total mayor control will likely increase over the next 10 years, 
contrary to the research of Danielson and Hochschild (1998). 
2. Mayors will become more susceptible to re-election based upon public 
perception of school reform and the rise of nontraditional candidates with 
education as a centerpiece of their platform. 
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3. Researchers will continue to compare the success of mayoral takeover as a 
governance reform strategy to those districts of comparable size under a 
traditional governance structure. 
4. Mayors will appoint school chancellors and superintendents from 
nontraditional backgrounds. 
5. Mayors must pay attention to expenditures and reform those processes and 
organizational structures that keep revenue from schoolhouses. 
6. Mayors must use financial metrics to evaluate their organizational reform. 
These metrics resonate with the public and local leaders, who act as the city’s 
shareholders. 
7. Mayors must continue to leverage their business acumen, relationships and 
leadership to bring greater investment into public schools (Viteritti, 2009). 
8. Mayors must engage union leadership in meaningful reform. Cities are usually 
saturated with union membership. Engaging unions in meaningful reform 
discussion plays well with the public and with teachers. 
9. Taking over control of the local public education agency is no longer a low 
risk governance strategy. Mayoral engagement in public school leadership is 
paramount to a successful reform movement. 
10. Mayors need to set the metrics for the public just prior to takeover. Other city 
services have metrics, such as public safety, and the metrics should not be 
exclusively academic, operational, financial, or political (Wong & Shen, 
2003). 
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11. The success of mayoral takeover of school districts is linked to the success of 
other city services and agencies that work toward the social welfare of the 
city’s youth (Usdan, 2006). 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The following recommendations for future research are based upon the review of 
literature and the analysis of data: 
1. Study the relationship between total control theory and improvements in 
organizational structures within school districts. 
2. Compare the total control theory districts with those under other types of mayoral 
control models. 
3. Develop other metrics of operational effectiveness for school districts under 
various forms of mayoral control. 
4. Develop other metrics of school district financial health for school districts under 
various forms of mayoral control. 
5. Explore the relationship between mayoral control of education and voter 
preferences. 
6. Investigate the risks to mayoral re-election involved with the various forms of 
mayoral control of education. 
7. Compare education to other factors that cause voters to make their decisions for 
who to vote for. 
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8. Compare the successes and failures of the various forms of mayoral control to 
those districts of comparable size and demographic data that continue under 
traditional governance structures. 
9. Compare operational and financial metrics to academic metrics. Assess if there 
are relationships between operational and financial metrics and academic metrics. 
10. Investigate the relationship of mayoral control of schools to citizen migration 
either to or from municipalities and suburbs. 
11. Investigate the precipitating factors for the various forms of mayoral control. 
Assess if certain non educational, political forces are involved in the eventual 
takeover of schools. 
12. Investigate the effectiveness of chancellors and superintendents from 
nontraditional backgrounds. 
 
Recommendations for Practice 
 This study revealed that operational and financial effectiveness in school districts 
can, in fact, be measured. Furthermore, this study further showed that polling data can 
reveal a strong divide in the electorate regarding feelings related to mayoral control. 
Clearly, many citizens may never be comfortable with the idea of a nontraditional school 
system in which the mayor has ultimate control like any other city department or service. 
However, in order to hedge against initial backlash of necessary reform, mayors must 
explicitly lay out their case for takeover. Too few mayors utilize data and measures that 
can help bolster their case for mayor control in favor of rhetorical sensationalizing of 
83 
 
current school district conditions. Ultimately, mayors must benchmark school district 
governance the same way they benchmark public safety departments and other city 
services. Setting a timeline by which the public can expect these benchmarks to take 
place is a good step in establishing transparency of school governance along with 
accountability that comes with the total control model, as Watson and Hill (2008) and 
Kirst and Bulkley (2000) argued. 
Operationally, mayors must, upon takeover, take a close look at all non-
instructional related services. Ultimately, resource reallocation to the schoolhouses will 
enhance academics, and play well politically to the citizens. An organizational 
restructuring should be an option on the table in order for this to occur. The appointment 
of a school superintendent or chancellor with a track record of successful organizational 
realignment is the key to ensuring operational effectiveness. Mayors who take over 
schools have a unique opportunity to replicate effective operational procedures from 
other large city departments in their school system. Specifically, consider the 
consolidation of supply chain management policy, which could not only eliminate layers 
of bureaucracy, but also help cities leverage supplier contracts, providing all city 
departments cost savings on supplies and eliminating wait time for such supplies. This 
could potentially bring a major cost savings for all city departments. 
Mayors must not, however, fall into the trap of trying to replicate another 
district’s operations plan, as circumstances are significantly different and vary from state 
to state and city to city. 
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Financially, the mayor must take a hard look at how revenue generation occurs, 
how budgeting takes place, and historical ROI data, a viable benchmark to document 
progress for a potentially skeptical public. Hiring a chief financial officer (CFO) for the 
school district is crucial. Many mayors will make the mistake of deputizing city 
administrators to handle oversight of the school systems budget in addition to other city 
services. There is much at stake in the takeover of the school system. Without viable, 
competent financial leadership within the school system, sound experience in school 
finance, mayors and citizens can expect more of the same, with the schoolhouses and 
students ultimately feeling the effects of financial mismanagement.  
From an organizational perspective, mayors must look at their new authority over 
the schools as an opportunity to reshape the organizational landscape of the school 
district. Urban school districts often are large bureaucracies. Mayors must reframe their 
school system from a culture of departmental isolationism to departmental 
interdependence. 
When a mayor has completed a historical financial analysis of the school district, 
laying out the financial benchmarks for the school districts by which the public can hold 
him/her accountable for, is a proper next step to ensure not only transparency in school 
district governance, but also instill accountability in those the mayor has appointed to 
those positions of influence, the superintendent or chancellor and the CFO. 
Politically, Mayor Adrian Fenty’s recent defeat in his re-election bid should cause 
all total control mayors and those considering a takeover to take pause and re-evaluate 
whether the political risks are worth it. Mayor Fenty lost because he did not read the 
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polling data which clearly showed that the African American citizens were skeptical of 
his leadership over the schools, which ultimately is what cost him his job and made him 
the first total control theory mayor to lose re-election.  
Ultimately, mayors need to treat public education with the same care as they do 
other public issues, like public safety, housing and public health. They must be prepared 
that voters will vote on a single issue, as voters did in September 2010 in the District of 
Columbia. Furthermore, trying to reform public education in a short time may potentially 
scare voters, who viewed the chancellor unfavorably for all of the reforms she attempted 
to institute on behalf of the mayor. The mayor made public education reform the 
signature issue of his re-election campaign and lost. Certainly, mayors and their staff 
members will need to study how Fenty and his administration failed in conveying the 
message that his control of public education in the District of Columbia was on a 
successful track. 
Above all else, there must be an acknowledgement that the blueprint for 
successful mayoral control is different in each city. Just as Fenty unsuccessfully 
attempted to replicate the successful takeover of New York City schools, mayors must 
look at the needs of their school districts and plan accordingly as to what can be 
accomplished in one year, two years, five years, and ten years. Every mayor considering 
some form of mayoral control should have a vision for their superintendent or chancellor, 
including what types of changes to organizational structures must take place to bring 
about the type of school district they want for their city, and a plan for holding those 
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appointed to positions of leadership in the school system accountable for benchmarked 
quarterly and annual goals.  
Mayors cannot underestimate the level of their engagement in public school 
policy and decision making. The public must see them actively involved in the 
operations, financials, and academics of their schools. 
Summary 
 The analysis of data presented in Chapter 4 has been discussed in Chapter 5. In 
this chapter, the findings and discussion were related to each research question, 
conclusions were provided, and recommendations for future research were offered. The 
chapter concluded with implications and recommendations for future practice. 
87 
 
APPENDIX A   
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
A Nation at Risk, [Electronic Summary]. 2001. Retrieved from 
http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/intro.html. 
 
Aarons, D. (2009) Rolling up their sleeves: Venture philanthropists pitch in for Chicago’s 
schools. Education Week, 28(18), 23-25. Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Analysis looks at effects of mayoral takeovers (2006, October). American School Board 
Journal, 12. 
 
Black, S. (2008, January). The takeover threat. American School Board Journal, 34-35. 
 
Bloomberg, M.R. “State of the City Address: Taking the Next Step.” New York City 
College of Technology. Brooklyn, NY. 17 Jan. 2007. 
 
Bloomberg, M.R. “State of the City Address.” Corona Park. Flushing Meadows, NY. 17 
Jan. 2008. 
 
Bloomberg, M.R. “State of the City Address.” Brooklyn College. Brooklyn, NY. 15 Jan. 
2009. 
 
Bloomberg, M.R. “State of the City Address.” Frank Sinatra High School of the Arts. 
Astoria, NY. 20 Jan. 2010. 
 
Borut, D., Bryant, A., & Houston, P. (2005, September 26). Conflict or consensus? Why 
collaboration between cities and school is the key to reform. Nation’s Cities 
Weekly, 9. 
 
Bosman, J. (2007, June 30). Small schools are ahead in graduation. The New York Times , 
p. B1. 
 
Broad, E. (2003, April 4). Address, National Governors Association Education Policy 
Advisors Institute, Marina Del Rey, CA, April 4, 
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/041703gepabroad.pdf 
 
Business crucial to school reform, [Editorial]. 2002, March 25. Crain’s New York 
Business. Retrieved from 
www.nycp.org/Web_News?Public%20Education/Crain’s%20Editorial 
 
 
 
90 
 
Carl, J. (2009, February 1). Good politics is good government: The troubling history of 
mayoral control of the public schools in twentieth century Chicago. American 
Journal of Education, 115(2), 305-336. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service 
No. EJ826477) Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Chicago Public School Reform Act of 1995, [Electronic Summary]. (1995).Retrieved 
from 
http://www.cps.edu/About_CPS/The_Board_of_Education/Pages/TheChicagoBoa
rdofEducation.aspx 
 
Council of the Great City Schools (2007) Analysis of Mayor Adrian Fenty's plan for the 
District of Columbia public schools. Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Council of the Great City Schools (2007). The mayor's plan for achieving success in the 
DCPS: Is the implementation likely to match the vision? Retrieved from ERIC 
database. 
 
Daley, R.M. “Inaugural: City of Chicago Address.” Chicago, IL. 21 May 2007. 
 
Daley, R.M. “City of Chicago Address.” Chicago, IL. 1 May 2008. 
 
Daley, R.M. “City of Chicago Address.” Chicago, IL. 15 July 2009. 
 
Daley, R.M. “City of Chicago Address.” Chicago, IL. 4 August 2010. 
 
Danielson, M. N., & Hochschild, J. (1998). Changing urban education: Lessons, cautions, 
prospects. In C.N. Stone (Ed.), Changing urban education (pp. 277-295). 
Lawrence, KS: University Press. 
 
Duncan, A. (2009). The importance of board and mayor partnerships. American School 
Board Journal, 196(10), 9-11. 
 
Edelstein, F. (2004). Mayors and school districts. School Planning & Management,  
16-22. Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Eisinger, P. (1997, Winter). Cities in the new federal order: Effects of devolution. La 
Follette Policy Report, 1-7. 
 
Fenty, A. M. "Moving Forward Faster: The 2007 State of the District Address." Congress 
Heights Senior Wellness Center. Washington, D.C. 21 Mar. 2007. 
 
Fenty, A. M. “Getting the Job Done: State of the District Address.” Washington, D.C. 
 14 Mar. 2008.   
91 
 
Fenty, A. M. “The State of the District Address.” Hattie Holmes Senior Wellness Center. 
Washington, D.C. 19 Mar. 2009. 
 
Fenty, A. M. “The State of the District Address.” Deanwood Recreation Center. 
Washington, D.C. 9 Apr. 2010. 
 
Henig, J., Hula, R., Orr, M., & Pedescleaux, D. (1999, January 1). The color of school 
reform: Race, politics, and the challenge of urban education. . (ERIC Document 
Reproduction Service No. ED448214) Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Henig, J. R., & Rich, W. C. (Eds.) (2004). Mayors in the middle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Hernandez, J. (2009, April 4). 2 City schools get Washington mayor's attention. New 
York Times, p. 16. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database 
 
Hess, F. (2008, May 1). Looking for leadership: Assessing the case for mayoral control of 
urban school systems. American Journal of Education, 114(3), 219-245. (ERIC 
Document Reproduction Service No. EJ790941) Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Honegger, S.D. (2010). Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary 
School Districts: School Year 2007-08 (Fiscal Year 2008) (NCES 2010-323). 
U.S. Department of Education. Washington, D.C. National Center for Education 
Statistics. Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2010323 
 
Kirst, M. W. (2002). Mayoral influence, new regimes, and public school governance. 
Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy Research in Education.  
 
Kirst, M., & Bulkley, K. (2000, March 1). New, improved mayors take over city schools. 
Phi Delta Kappan, 81(7), 538-40,542-46. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service 
No. EJ601260) Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Kirst, M. W., & Edelstein, F. (2006). The maturing mayoral role in education. Harvard 
Education Review 76(2), 152-164. 
 
Lagorio, C. (2005). U.S. education slips in rankings. Associated Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/13/national/main838207.shtml. 
 
Maxwell, L. (2009, October 14). Education secretary leads chorus calling for big city-hall 
role. Education Week 29(7), S10-S11. 
 
92 
 
Medina, J. (2009, February 7). Klein defends mayoral control of public schools. The New 
York Times. p. A18. 
 
Menino, T. M. “State of the City Address.” Strand Theatre. Boston, Mass. 1 Jan. 2007. 
 
Menino, T. M. “State of the City Address.” Strand Theatre. Boston, Mass. 15 Jan. 2008. 
 
Menino, T. M. “State of the City Address.” Faneuil Hall. Boston, Mass. 13 Jan. 2009. 
 
Menino, T. M. “Inaugural Address.” Boston, Mass. 4 Jan. 2010. 
 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. [Electronic Summary]. (2001). Retrieved from 
http://www.ed.gov/print/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.html 
 
Olson, L. (2007). More power to schools. Education Week, 27(13), 23-26. Retrieved from 
ERIC database. 
 
Portz, J. (2004). Boston: Agenda setting and school reform in a mayor centric system. In 
J. R. Henig, & W. C. Rich (Eds.), Mayors in the middle (pp. 96-119). Princeton, 
NJ: University Press. 
 
Quinnipiac University Polling Institute New York City Poll, March 24, 2009. Poll 
questions retrieved from http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1302.xml?ReleaseID=1278. 
 
Reid, K. (2003, April 9). Mayors stepping up to improve quality of city schools. 
Education Week, 22(30), 8. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier database.  
 
Rowan, B. (1982) Organizational structure and the institutional environment: The case of 
public schools, Administrative Science Quarterly, 27(2), 259-279. 
 
Sack-Min, J. (2007). The new breed. American School Board Journal, 194(11), 35-37. 
Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Salisbury, R. (1967). Schools and politics in the big city. Harvard Education Review 
67(Summer), 408-424. 
 
Schachter, R. (2009). Tell it to the mayor. District Administration, 45(7), 23-27. 
 
Shipps, D. (2004). Chicago: The national model reexamined. In J. R. Henig, & W. C. 
Rich (Eds.), Mayors in the middle (pp. 96-119). Princeton, NJ: University Press. 
 
93 
 
Snyder, T.D., Tan, A.G., and Hoffman, C.M. (2004). Digest of Education Statistics 2003, 
(NCES 2005–025). U.S.Department of Education, National Center for Education 
Statistics. Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics. Retrieved 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005025.pdf. 
 
Stewart, N., & Craig, T. (2010, September 4). Rhee to hit the trail with Fenty campaign. 
The Washington Post, pp. B1, B4. 
 
Stone, C. N. (1998). Civic capacity and urban school reform. In C. N. Stone (Ed.) 
Changing urban education (pp. 250-276). Lawrence, KS: University Press.  
 
Togneri, W., & Anderson, S. (2003). How High Poverty Districts Improve. Leadership, 
33(1), 12-16. Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Traver, A. (2006). Institutions and organizational change: Reforming New York City’s 
public school system. Journal of Educational Policy, 21(5), 497-514. Retrieved 
from ERIC database. 
 
U.S. Department of Education. (1993). Digest of Education Statistics (NCES 93292). 
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93292.pdf 
 
U.S. Department of Education. (1999). Digest of Education Statistics (NCES 1999036). 
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs99/1999036.pdf 
 
Usdan, M. D. (2006). Mayors and public education: The case for greater involvement. 
Harvard Education Review 76(2), 147-152. 
 
Viteritti, J. (2009, April 8). Should mayors run schools? Education Week, 26, 32. 
Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Watson, A., & Hill, P. (2008). Mayoral intervention: Right for Seattle schools? Center on 
Reinventing Public Education Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Whittle, C. (2005). Crash course: Imagining a better future for public education. New 
York: Penguin Group. 
 
Wong, K. K., & Shen, F. X. (2003). Big city mayors and school governance reform: The 
case for school district takeover. Peabody Journal of Education 78(1), 5-32. 
Retrieved from ERIC database. 
 
Wong, K. K., & Shen, F. X. (2007). Mayoral leadership matters: Lessons learned from 
mayoral control of large urban school systems. Peabody Journal of Education 
82(4), 737-768. Retrieved from ERIC database. 
94 
 
Wong, K. K., Shen, F. X., Anagnostopoulos, D., & Rutledge, S. (2007). The education 
mayor: Improving America’s schools. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press.  
 
Zhou, L., and Gaviola, N. (2007). Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and 
Secondary School Districts: School Year 2004–05 (Fiscal Year 2005) (NCES 
2007-355). U.S. Department of Education. Washington, DC: National Center for 
Education Statistics. Retrieved from 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2007355. 
 
 
